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Abstract 
This thesis will use survey data from Norwegian managers to answer the 
following research question: 
 
Are managers in public administrations more bureaucratic in their attitudes 
toward structure and values than managers in private enterprises? 
 
I will argue that the classical bureaucracy, as described by Max Weber, can be 
understood as defined by structure and values. One often disparages the 
structural elements of bureaucracy and forgets about the bureaucratic values. 
The mean scores from AFF's 2011 leadership survey will be used to learn if 
managers in public administrations and private enterprises differ in reported 
attitudes toward bureaucratic structure and values. 
 
The following analysis and discussion will debate and present explanations for 
the results, and suggest that there are both similarities and important 
distinctions between managers in public administrations and private enterprises.  
 
My main findings are that managers in public administrations are not more 
bureaucratic than managers of private enterprises in their attitudes to structure. 
They do however show more bureaucratic-values, such as bureaucratic ethos and 
public values. 
 
I will discuss these results with the appropriate theory; similar attitudes toward 
structure will be explained with a higher degree of professionalism in public 
administrations, multi-divisional hierarchies, complex goals, homogenous 
organizational forms, demand for delivery, fear of consequences and differing 
expectations. Differences in value will be explained by the nature of public 
service, and a higher degree of professionalism in public administrations. Higher 
"post-bureaucratic"-values, such as employee-involvement and communication 
with their stakeholders, will be used to indicate that even though public 
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administrations show more bureaucratic values, they are not necessarily more 
rigid and unable to adapt. At the end I will discuss how contemporary public 
managers should be understood as more complex actors than those of the classic 
machine-bureaucracy, and the implications this has for our understanding of 
public administrations. 
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1 Introduction 
The bureaucratic organizational form is one of the most extensively debated of 
our time. From the news we see political opposition blame inefficiency on it, 
before promptly expanding it when they find themselves in power. Bureaucracies 
have to a degree become antonymous to efficiency, and are talked about as an 
organizational form obstructing progress and hindering service delivery. The 
Norwegian government has even made it one of their goals do debureaucratize 
Norwegian public sector (St.meld. nr 1. 2014-2015, 2014). By defining 
bureaucracy narrowly as delimiting structures, we fail to appreciate the 
bureaucratic values aiding a rational tool capable of acting faster and more 
accurately than any other organizational form (Weber, 1991). This thesis will 
discuss the duality of bureaucratic values and structure, and explore how they 
are reflected in attitudes of managers in public administrations and private 
enterprises. 
 
It has been argued that public administrations have not been given the same 
extensive attention as other areas of leadership-studies (Vandenabeele et al, 
2014). This thesis will contribute to the field by using empirical data to explore if 
managers in public administrations can be considered more or less bureaucratic 
than their private equivalents. By comparing the prevalence of "bureaucratic-
attitudes" among managers in public administration and private enterprises I 
seek to increase our understanding of public managers. This will provide a more 
accurate picture of the men leading these supposedly "bureaucratic" 
organizations.  
 
This thesis can be seen as building on the work of Robert K. Merton (1960) and 
Victor Thompson (1961). They were primarily concerned with the negative effects 
formal bureaucratic structures had on officials. By taking a fresh look at 
managers, inspired by new readings of Max Weber, I seek to take their theories a 
step further. New interpretations of Weber suggest that bureaucracies contain 
both structure and values, with values as the defining quality (Kallinikos, 2004; 
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Bartels, 2009), contrary to earlier readings which mainly saw bureaucracy as 
structural elements (Udy, 1959; Hall, 1963). By utilizing data from AFF's 2011 
leadership study on Norwegian managers I will compare managers in public 
administration and private enterprises to learn if one or the other can be seen as 
inherently more "bureaucratic". By testing if there is a difference between sectors 
we can learn whether managers in public administrations should be considered 
more, or less, bureaucratic than managers in private enterprises, and whether 
one or the other is more prone to "bureaucratization" (Thompson, 1961). 
 
First, I will review literature on bureaucracy and note two different 
understandings of the organizational form. The main point of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that bureaucracies can be understood as both structures and values. 
The term "value" is defined as including both formal and informal ways of 
conducting business. With "values" I will primarily focus on public values and the 
bureaucratic ethos of loyalty to formal rules, as well as "post-bureaucratic"-
values of communication and employee-involvement (Weber, 1991; Kernaghan, 
2000).  
 
I will argue, by using theory and empirical data from Norwegian managers that 
public managers are not more positive toward structural elements of 
bureaucracies, but they are more bureaucratic in their attitudes to values.  
Similar attitudes toward structure will be explained with a higher degree of 
professionalism in public administrations, multi-divisional hierarchies, complex 
goals, homogenous organizational forms, demand for delivery, fear of 
consequences and differing expectations. Differences in value will be explained by 
the nature of public service and a higher degree of professionalism in public 
administrations. Higher "post-bureaucratic"-values, such as employee-
involvement and communication with their stakeholders, will be used to indicate 
that even though public administrations show more bureaucratic values, they are 
not necessarily more rigid and unable to adapt. At the end I will discuss how 
contemporary public managers should be understood as more complex actors 
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than those of the classic machine-bureaucracy, and what implications this has for 
our understanding of public administrations. 
 
My research question is:  
Are managers in public administrations more bureaucratic in their attitudes 
toward structure and values than managers in private enterprises? 
1.1 Definitions 
"Bureaucracy" has different meanings to different people. I will not look at 
bureaucracy narrowly as relating only to the performing of public tasks, but as 
an organizational form prevalent in both public and private sector (Weber, 1991). 
Other theories and research on the field will be utilized to understand and 
explain the results.  
 
Usage of the term "manager" instead of "leader" when describing Norwegian 
managers has been carefully thought through. There is a whole industry 
concerned with the differences between "managers" and "leaders", and the 
implications of this. A popular notion is that "management" is dead (Cloke and 
Goldsmith, 2002), and that they are replaced by visionary leaders (Bennis, 1989). 
Both terms means a person leading a group or organization (Oxford Dictionaries, 
2015), but the connotations of the words in the literature suggests that leaders 
are seen as visionary, while managers are mainly concerned with administration 
(Bennis, 1989). My contribution with this thesis is not to define the qualities of 
leadership, or comment on the qualities of "managers" or "leaders". I have chosen 
to consequently use the term manager about all the respondents, which includes 
top and middle-level managers in a formal management-position. I do not want 
this thesis to be bogged down in a debate about "managers" and "leaders". My 
choice brings no connotations, I simply must chose a word to use, and my chosen 
word is manager. 
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2 Bureaucracies are Structure and 
Value 
This section will discuss different understandings of the term "bureaucracy". Max 
Weber's (1991) writings on bureaucracy will be used to present two 
understandings of bureaucracy: An account mainly concerned with structural 
elements, and a more contemporary understanding seeing bureaucratic values as 
the defining quality of bureaucracy. Additional scholarly contributions will be 
used to illustrate the two interpretations. This discussion will demonstrate that 
the understandings of Weber's contributions are constantly evolving; scholars 
read and re-read, and find new areas to emphasize. By discussing a dual 
understanding of bureaucratic elements I seek to create a foundation for my 
empirical assessment of Norwegian managers. Deliberating these different 
understandings of bureaucracy helps place my contribution into a historic 
context: I wish to learn if managers in public administrations or private 
enterprises are more bureaucratic, both in the structural and value-
understanding of the term. By looking at and including both these aspects I aim 
to comprehensively capture the term "bureaucratic" in my discussion and 
empirical-analysis.  
 
Max Weber's writings on the bureaucratic ideal types have inspired and guided 
those who came after him. It represents a natural starting point for any 
discussion about bureaucracy. Solidly in the rational school of thought, Weber 
(1991) saw bureaucratic organizations as technically superior to other forms of 
organization; it is faster and cheaper in its strictest form than any other form of 
administration. Hierarchy and defined structure are as an asset for bureaucratic 
organizations, making them coordinated and precise while minimizing 
unnecessary use of resources. 
 
Weber (1991) presents six characteristics of bureaucracy, and five traits of the 
position of officialdom. Weber's bureaucracy can be seen as part structure and 
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part value. The six characteristics can be understood as structural ideal types 
facilitating a rational organization with a focus on hierarchy, formalization, 
rules, structuring and regular activities. The five traits of the position can be 
seen as values facilitated by the structure. Value is taken to mean what we fill 
the structure with. Examples of bureaucratic values include the bureaucratic 
ethos, separation of role and person and rational-legal authority (Weber, 1991). 
 
The structural elements of the ideal types enable officials to occupy a formalized 
role; separating the function of the organizational role and the private life of the 
official. The official is "not considered the personal servant of a ruler" (Weber, 
1991: 199). The five traits the official should fill in the organization can be 
understood at what the structure is trying to achieve, the ends created by the 
structural means, and a critical component of bureaucracy.  
2.1 Bureaucratic Rationality 
Weber describes a "discipline of officialdom" with a set of attitudes for "precise 
obedience within his habitual activity" (Weber, 1991: 229). This indicates that an 
important trait for the bureaucratic-official is to be precise and obedient, 
following instructions precisely. This system based on the rationality of 
instructions illustrates how the instrument of bureaucracy can be used for good 
or bad; the bureaucracy is dependent on good instructions to do good work, just 
like a hammer is dependent on a steady hand not to hurt the thumb. This is not 
to say that this is the best system for society, but is the best system for getting 
things done, and it is prevalent because it is the most rational way of organizing. 
Instead of an organization being ruled by a dominant master, it is ruled by 
rationality, and the bureaucratic organization is the best vehicle for delivering 
this rationality (Weber, 1991).  
 
A possible downside of this rationality-driven world is the creation of an "iron 
cage"; trapping man in a mundane, routinized environment. The dominance of 
rationality, driven by capitalism in all facets of life, could create an environment 
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weighing man down more than it lifts him up (Parsons and Gidden, 1930). The 
"iron-cage" should be seen as a description of a possible worst-case scenario of a 
capitalist-driven rationality, and should not be seen as a general negative trait of 
bureaucracy. Additionally it has been suggested that the translation into "iron 
cage" is erroneous and portrays a rigidity and dimness to the matter not intended 
by Weber (Baehr, 2001). While the term "iron cage" might be too negative, it is 
important as it suggests that organizations driven by rationality could have 
harmful effects on the people working in them. 
2.2 Bureaucracy as Structure 
Stanley Udy (1959) and Richard Hall (1963) saw the structural elements of the 
ideal types as useful for studying organizations. They understood bureaucratic 
organizations as defined by their structural elements. Ideal types were used to 
create organizational traits for testing the degree of bureaucracy in an 
organization (Udy, 1959; Hall, 1963). By comparing organizational traits of any 
formal organization (hierarchical authority structure, specialized administrative 
staff and differential rewards according to office), to traits only occurring in 
“rational-legal bureaucracies" (limited objectives, emphasis on performance, 
segmented participation and compensatory rewards). Udy (1959) set out to test 
organization's degree of bureaucracy by measuring structural elements. When 
looking at the occurrence of these different traits in 150 different organizations, 
he found that the three “bureaucratic”-traits and the four “rational-legal”-traits 
had positive associations with each other, but no association between the groups. 
This suggests that Weber's theories on the rational and hierarchical coming 
together is not an accurate description for how organizations actually look (Udy, 
1959). It also showed that the structural elements of bureaucracy are rather 
flexible in their appearances across organizations; it is hard to find a pattern 
proving "bureaucracy", all structural elements plays a role to varying degrees.  
 
Richard Hall (1963), like Udy, set out to test the degree of bureaucracy in 
organizations with indicators based on the bureaucratic structural elements 
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(Hall, 1963). His results also showed that structural traits are found to a varying 
degree, and without being highly correlated with each other. There is no 
apparent correlation between the different traits, indicating that organizations 
come in every shape and form (Hall, 1963). This confirms the flexibility of the 
bureaucratic structure found by Udy; organizations are found in different shapes 
and forms along the continuum. Empirical data seems to support that 
bureaucratic structure is not a dichotomy, but an organizational form of different 
traits on a continuous scale. 
 
An exception to this is that organizations defined as autonomous, are observed as 
less bureaucratic (Hall 1968). This can be due to the fact that authority in these 
organizations are decentralized to the professionals as there is no strong 
hierarchical "external or administrative jurisdiction" (Hall, 1968), and 
unsurprisingly they were found to score low on the dimension "hierarchy of 
authority", and "rules" as well as "impersonality", possibly due to the small 
amount of clients and face-to-face meeting used to define autonomous 
organizations in the survey (Hall, 1968). One can discuss whether organizations 
like these are hierarchical at all, and if they should even be called bureaucratic. 
They do not appear to answer to a monocratic entity, nor have a separation of 
role and person; authority is anchored in the individual's knowledge rather than 
formal-rationality. There is also an issue of size being a potential underlying 
variable, as the autonomous-organizations are likely to be smaller (Hall, 1968). 
Hall's (1968) research seems to largely replicate Udy (1959) and Hall's (1963) 
earlier findings, with the exception that organizations which may not be 
bureaucratic at all are less bureaucratic.  
 
This relative flexibility of structural traits is further confirmed empirically in 
what is called the "multidimensional bureaucratic structure space" (Reimann, 
1973: 462). Bernard Reimann (1973) and John Child (1972) developed 
questionnaires to uncover bureaucratic traits based on structural objectives such 
as number of defined roles, organizational charts, and more. Their findings are 
consistent with that of Hall and Udy; there is no universal description fitting 
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organizations regarding bureaucratic traits; all show some traits, but the traits 
they show differ. The structural understanding of bureaucracy, while prominent, 
has a hard time finding empirical data accurately describing "the one" 
bureaucratic organization (Child, 1972; Reimann, 1973; Hall, 1963; Udy, 1959).  
 
It is suggested that the structural flexibility is due to “technical nature of the 
task being performed”, and the fact that rational-legality “tend to be mutually 
inconsistent in the same formal organizations” (Udy, 1959: 794). Organizations 
are not simple or either-or in regards to structure and rational-legality. 
Empirically testing the structural elements of the bureaucratic ideal types 
reveals that organizations are not necessarily logically coherent in regards to the 
ideal types, but vary based on factors in their environment (Udy, 1959). This 
structural understanding of the ideal typical rational bureaucracy sees 
organization as unstable social systems, adapting to the tasks they are 
performing (Udy, 1959). This fits the contingency theory-approach to 
organizations where the chosen way to organize is seen as depending on internal 
and external factors (Child, 1984) 
 
Structural contingency theory has been a staple of organizational research for a 
long time. Projects such as those performed by Udy (1959), Hall (1963), Reimann 
(1973) and so forth have all tried to explain the structural elements of 
bureaucracy with internal and external demands. A broad look at the empirical 
data published between 1960 and 1999 supports that there is not one constant 
form for bureaucratic structure, but there is a clear occurrence of bureaucratic 
control (Walton, 2005). This indicates that the structure of organizations might 
differ, but the bureaucratic control remains consistent; while the structure is 
relatively flexible there seems to be some sort of constant value carried out by 
these organizations. The value of bureaucratic authority seems to exist 
independently of the structure, signifying that there is a constant rational-legal 
value present within bureaucracies. This value appears to some degree separate 
from the structure. The elements of structure and formalization are relatively 
flexible in organizations as a whole; somethings work somewhere, other thing 
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work somewhere else and there is no clear dichotomy to it, but a continuous 
scale. The ways in which organizations organize differ, but the reason they 
organize stay the same: to facilitate control. The only constant seems to be the 
ways, and not the means, of the bureaucratic organization (Walton, 2005). There 
is no consistency to what kind of structural elements make these organizations 
bureaucratic or not.  
2.3 Bureaucratic Values 
The value-approach to bureaucracy represents an opposing understanding to the 
structural-understanding of bureaucracies. Instead of seeing structural elements 
as the defining quality of organizations, they are seen as facilitating bureaucratic 
values. These values are the defining quality of bureaucracies (Kallinikos, 2004; 
Bartels, 2009). Structure in this perspective becomes a means to achieve 
bureaucratic values. Values, such as the bureaucratic ethos, is seen as important 
and crucial to bureaucracies because they discourage a slave-master relationship, 
making it possible for an official to serve the hierarchy while keeping his 
personal interests independent from the job: "structure is a fundamental vehicle 
by which organizations achieve bounded rationality" (Thompson, 1967: 54; 
Weber, 1991; Bartels, 2009). The structural elements facilitate bounded 
rationality in the organization, making it possible to make decisions with a 
limited number of choices.  
 
Koen Bartels (2009) argues that one should not see the ideal types as normative, 
structural, limits for organizations, but rather as ways for individuals to keep 
their freedom within a hierarchy. Limited freedom is an important value of 
bureaucracy; it allows the official to make judgements without making 
accommodations to peripheral needs. Structure is not seen as limiting to the 
officials; it allows them to make decisions separated from external factors. It 
facilitates freedom in the hierarchy through a bureaucratic ethos. The structural 
ideal types "increase the chance of particular kinds of behavior" (Bartels, 2009: 
459). They create systems that increase the chance of bureaucratic substantive 
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and formal rationality, uniting the ways officials follow instructions with a 
reason for doing so. The bureaucratic ethos includes both an adherence to formal 
rules and "explicit substantive decision-making" (Bartels, 2009: 461). The ideal 
types help the individual deal with "the dilemma of obedience and autonomy in 
bureaucratic organizations" (Bartels, 2009: 462).  
 
The structural ideal types describe how it is possible for the official to balance 
following formal rules, with the demands of making a judgement: "Substantive 
rationality signifies behaving according to a set of values after making a 
judgment about the possible effects of actions for multiple values" (Bartels, 2009: 
463), and "Bureaucrats operate at the nexus of acting according to explicit 
judgments about the consequences of governmental actions for society" (Bartels, 
2009: 467). Values of substantive and formal rationality are united and 
facilitated by way of structure. By limiting the considerations an official must 
make, and protecting his individual freedom with boundaries, it limits external 
pressures, protecting citizens from unjust actions (Bartels, 2009). The lack of 
obedience to a person, facilitated by the structure, makes bureaucratic systems 
better able to handle complex administrative tasks than traditional systems. The 
members are able to question their superiors and be independent as their roles 
define their relationship rather than their personality (Scott 1981). 
 
This view sees values, not structure, as the essence of bureaucracies (Kallinikos, 
2004; Du Gay, 2008; Bartels, 2009). The value-approach to bureaucracy 
represents an alternative to the structural. The structures are seen as merely 
facilitating the real defining quality of bureaucracy; values. This is supported in 
Weber's own writings, where we find a passage arguing for the relativity of the 
structural ideal types (pure types): 
 
one of course from the beginning has to keep his eye on the fluidity and the 
overlapping transitions of all these organizational principles. Their 'pure' 
types, after all, are to be considered merely as border cases which are 
especially valuable and indispensable for analysis. Historical realities, 
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which almost always appear in mixed forms, have moved and still move 
between such pure types.  
(Weber, 1991: 244) 
 
The bureaucratic structure is understood as a framework that facilitates 
bureaucratic values (Bartels, 2009; Weber, 1991). Structure is a result of 
rationalization, and must be rooted in rationality to be considered bureaucratic: 
"The march of bureaucracy has destroyed structures of domination which had no 
rational character" (Weber, 1991: 244). Structure changes with the environment, 
while the values of separation of person and role, authority from rational-legal 
objective as well as bureaucratic ethos are stable rational-values kept in the 
bureaucracy regardless of its structural form. This is possible as the structure 
only facilitates the values, and does not create them; the bureaucratic values 
spring from rationality, not structure, making structure a tool and not a reason 
for the bureaucratic values.  
 
This is not to say the managers cannot "value" structure or see structure as a 
value in and of itself, but it is proposed that structural elements of Weber's 
bureaucratic ideal types are not an inherent value of bureaucracy, but rather a 
description of how values like separation, rationality and the bureaucratic ethos 
can be realized in the organization. 
 
Critical to understanding this reading of bureaucracy is to understand that the 
structural ideal types have a rational purpose, and that purpose is to facilitate 
the bureaucratic values. That does not mean that the structural elements of the 
ideal types are the only way for organizations to achieve these values, they are 
merely a suggestion (Höpfl, 2006).  
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2.4 The Universality of Bureaucracies 
By acknowledging the different perspectives on the term "bureaucracy" we can 
better understand it and what it entails. Weber (1991) saw the bureaucratic 
organizational form as one fitting all kinds of large organizations, not only public 
administrations. The development of the bureaucratic structure is credited to the 
capitalist market. Its need for speed and precision drives development and 
creates the need for businesses and public organizations built on bureaucratic 
ideals. Bureaucracies are the "optimum possibility" (Weber, 1991: 215) for 
objectively placing tasks at the hands of those with the most expertise, and for 
creating a system where "purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements" 
are eliminated from official business (Weber, 1991: 216). The bureaucratic 
organizational form limits what is taken into considerations; it limits the "noise" 
and makes it possible for a person in a complex world to function in a role. It 
creates boundaries between the person and the role, creating objective experts 
out of people, making decision-makers independent of elements besides their 
expertise. This could create a more perfect rationality in a complex world where 
no such thing is thought to exist. Weber sees the fully established bureaucracy as 
a superior instrument for carrying "community action into rationally ordered 
societal action" (Weber, 1991: 228). It is the optimal tool for implementing and 
carrying out decision-making (Weber, 1991).  
 
A continuation of this was that Weber saw the development of the bureaucratic 
organizational form as happening to both the public and private sector: 
"Business-management throughout rests on increasing precision, steadiness, 
and, above all, the speed of operations" (1991: 215). And while he acknowledges 
that the "bureaucratic apparatus may, and actually does, produce definite 
obstacles to the discharge of business in a manner suitable for the single case" 
(1991: 215), he sticks to arguing that the bureaucratic form is optimal for 
achieving the speed and precision needed in organizations of the time (Weber, 
1991). Bureaucracy was not seen by Weber (1991) as an organizational form 
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exclusively for public administration, but something all kinds of organizations 
would benefit from. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has discussed two schools of thoughts regarding the defining 
qualities of bureaucracy: Structure and values. The structural approach has not 
been able to empirically confirm structure as the defining quality. A pure 
contingency-understanding of structure is further challenged by scholars arguing 
that organizations are not internally consistent or able to be explained by one 
model, they have multiple internal objectives and forms (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 
1981; Olsen, 2006). The relative flexibility of the structural ideal types does not 
have to be a weakness of the bureaucratic model: "The relativity of the ideal 
types is not unexpected as Weber's ideal types are not expected to be universal or 
observed in every organization, but they are a nice starting point when looking 
for bureaucracies" (Blau, 1963: 310).  
 
This does suggest that the structural elements of organizations are relative, and 
a competing school of thought argues that the structural view of the bureaucratic 
organization alone is not enough to understand them. The value-approach to 
bureaucracy represents an alternative understanding founded on the notion that 
the structure only facilitates the values, and these values are the defining quality 
of organizations. This can be supported empirically by studies showing that the 
structure in organizations varies to a large degree, but some bureaucratic values, 
like control, stays intact (Walton, 2005) 
 
Based on responses from managers, it is possible to test to what degree managers 
in public administrations have more positive attitudes toward the bureaucratic 
structure, or value, than their private counterparts. If managers in Norwegian 
public administrations are more bureaucratic than managers in private 
enterprises, they are expected to show more positive attitudes to bureaucratic 
structure or values. By measuring both the structure-approach, and the concept 
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of values we can fully comprehend if there is a difference among managers in 
public administrations and private enterprises. The research done on the 
structural approach by Stanley Udy and his peers suggest that the structural 
elements of bureaucracy are not systematic different among the managers, and 
this hypotheses will be tested on Norwegian managers. 
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3 Method 
Attitudes of Norwegian managers will be tested by using secondary statistical 
data from the 2011-edition of the leadership study by The Administrative 
Research Institute (AFF) at the Norwegian School of Economics. The use of 
secondary data is a challenge, and using it besides it intended primary use might 
in some cases warrant a lengthy discussion. The AFF study's primary use is to 
map managers' attitudes to their leadership role and work situation (Dalen and 
Ansteensen, 2011). Utilizing this study to examine attitude-differences between 
managers in public administrations and private enterprises is within the scope of 
the primary use, making a lengthy discussion unwarranted.  
 
It is important to emphasize that this survey measures attitudes of managers, 
not the objective reality of the organizations. I will present the managers' 
subjective understanding of their organization. It has been proposed that a 
measurement of attitudes contains more than just the cognitive-dimension, it can 
also reveal an "evaluative dimensions", influencing the future behavior of the 
respondent and appear to be of relative permanence (Reid, 2006). Attitude-
studies can to that extent be a very useful way of understanding a manager's 
behavior and actions.  
 
There are many proposed pitfalls of attitude-studies and use of indexes to 
measure attitudes. I am confident that rigorous testing of internal consistency 
and unidimensionality ensures that the indexes are as good as attitude indexes 
can get (Reid, 2006). They will provide results with significant information about 
the attitudes of Norwegian managers. From an attitude-survey it is possible to 
compare the attitudes of managers, but not say something absolute about the 
attitudes themselves as they appear in the vacuum of the survey (Reid, 2006). 
Because of this I will only use the attitude-scales for comparisons between 
sectors, and not use the measurement for an absolute measurement of leadership 
attitudes in Norway. In a perfect world I would follow the survey-data with a 
suggested independent observation such as interviews or case-studies (Reid, 
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2006). Unfortunately, this thesis is constrained in terms of time and scope, but 
additional research concerning bureaucratic attitudes among managers in 
private and public sector could further enlighten the subject with independent 
observations. While surveys with scales could be criticized for trying to capture 
complex issues with a small amount of questions (Reid, 2006), they are an 
efficient and cost-effective way of collecting large amounts of data. These 
observations can inform the debate and probe further research into the field. 
3.1 The Survey 
The 2011 AFF-leadership study is a comprehensive mail-in survey of a varied 
selection of Norwegian top and middle-management. A response rate of 71% 
yielded 2910 respondents. This survey is concerned with managers in a formal 
leadership position. Middle-managers, representing the biggest cohort in the 
survey, were randomly selected from the organizations. Top managers are 
managers running the local divisions, not necessarily the CEO of the group or 
head of the national organization. Respondents where weighted to counter 
systematic bias created by probability of selection. The size and scope of the 
study should produce representative results (Dalen and Ansteensen, 2011). 
3.2 Separating Private/Public Organizations 
With private and public sector becoming increasingly intertwined, it can be 
difficult to clearly separate them from each other (Peters, 2003). Information on 
industry and organizational sector from survey will make this separation 
attainable for my purposes. Information on self-reported industry and sector 
makes it possible to separate those identifying themselves as working in 
state/municipal administration/units from those working in private enterprises 
and other organizational forms. A further distinction is made to isolate those 
working in publically owned enterprises. Based on a combination of self-reported 
data and organizational-registers the respondents will be separated into four 
groups: "Private Enterprise", "Public Administration", "Public Enterprise" and 
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"Others". From this I will look at how managers in "Private Enterprise" compare 
to managers in "Public Administration". This way of grouping the managers 
makes it possible to isolate and study public administration without results being 
impacted by public enterprises. There is still the possibility for differences across 
the spectrum of public administration. This selection presents a look at how 
managers in public administration as an entity compares to managers in private 
enterprises as an entity. The groups are recoded from 11 industry-variables in 
the following way: 
 Organizational Sector: 
o 1: Private Enterprise: 
 Wholly private corporation 
 Foundation 
 Other private business 
 Co-operation 
o 2: Public Administration 
 State Administration/Unit 
 Municipal Administration/Unit 
o 3: Public enterprise 
 State owned governmental company with limited 
responsibility 
 Fully state-owned corporation 
 Fully municipal-owned corporation 
o 4: Other 
 Corporations co-owned by public and private 
 Union/NGO 
 Other 
 
Some exceptions were made to increase the validity of the categories. By cross-
referencing reported sector with industry I was better able to separate between 
the different categories and place respondents in the right one. The variables are 
recoded so managers belonging to private sector registered as corporations will be 
coded to "Private Enterprise" regardless of what they rapport. Public enterprises 
at the state and municipal level are coded to "Public Enterprise" regardless of 
what they rapport. Companies are coded to "Private Enterprise" or "Public 
Enterprise" dependent on sector, never "Public Administration". Managers in 
foundations registered as foundations are coded to "Others" while other 
foundational forms are coded to "Private Enterprise". The final distribution after 
these adjustments looked like this: 
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3.2.1 Large Organizations 
By further separating the categories to only include managers from "large" 
organizations, those with more than 100 members, the effect of size will be 
negated while keeping a high number of respondents: 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Private Ent. 
100+ 
403 13,8 37,1 37,1 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
404 13,9 37,2 74,2 
Public Ent. 
100+ 
280 9,6 25,8 100,0 
Total 1087 37,4 100,0  
Missing System 1823 62,6   
Total 2910 100,0   
 
Only including "large" organizations gives a large and similar distribution of 
respondents. It also limits size-differences as a possible explanation for the 
differences between public and private organizations. It has been argued that 
larger organizations are more bureaucratic and are harder to change (Adams, 
1985). With that in mind it makes sense to look at large organizations as they are 
likely to be most extreme, giving a good base for comparison between sectors, 
keeping size out of it as much as possible.  
 
Public/Private 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Private 
Ent. 
1545 53,1 53,1 53,1 
Public 
Adm. 
476 16,4 16,4 69,5 
Public Ent. 509 17,5 17,5 86,9 
Other 380 13,1 13,1 100,0 
Total 2910 100,0 100,0  
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In the population as a whole it is reported that organizations of this size are 
fairly uncommon with a majority of the organizations in public administration 
and private enterprises reported to be between 1-19 employees (SSB, 2015). 
These numbers are not reflected in the selection of this survey, as only 5% of the 
respondents from the public sector work in organizations with less than 20 
members, 85% report to work in organizations with more than 100 employees. 
Private enterprises are skewed in the same direction but to a lesser degree; 29% 
report to work in organizations with less than 20 employees, 26% report to work 
in organizations bigger than 100 employees. This is higher than in the population 
(SSB, 2015). The ratio between large and small organizations seems to be skewed 
among the respondents compared to the population as a whole, possibly due to 
selection bias, or that there have been used different methods for collecting data 
on the size of organizations between SSB and AFF.  
 
Including all private and public organizations in the data-material could make 
the data less representative for the population as a whole, weakening the value of 
the data found. By only including responses from managers in organizations with 
more than 100 employees I can say something meaningful about the subsection 
"large Norwegian organizations". This is better than presenting something not 
meaningful about all Norwegian organizations. As the respondents attitudes do 
not change drastically with size, I will keep my representative selection of "large" 
organizations and leave the question of small/large organizations to future 
projects. 
3.2.2 Gender and Educational Differences 
Public administrations recruit women and people with higher education to a 
higher degree than private enterprises (Jacobsen 2013; Strand, 2007), which is 
also reflected in this study: 
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Large 
Total 
Private Ent. 
100+ 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
Public Ent. 
100+ 
Man/Woman? Man 317 212 189 718 
Woman 86 192 91 369 
Total 403 404 280 1087 
 
Gender and educational differences might work as an underlying or mediating 
variable for the independent variable "organizational sector". Nonetheless I will 
treat sector as the predictor variable on the account that these differences are 
real and observable in these organizations. I will not focus especially on the 
reasons for the differences, but rather acknowledge their existence and possible 
effect, while looking at what these differences mean for the observed attitudes of 
managers. Differences between the sectors can be explained by gender, education 
or a myriad of other variables, but they exist nonetheless and contribute to the 
differences we might see between managers in public and private organizations. 
When relevant, I will perform correlation-analysis pointing to the comparative 
effects of sector, gender and education. Observable differences are the main-focus 
of this thesis, but explanatory underlying factors will be briefly discussed. 
3.3 Representative and Significant Results 
Results Are judged on the recommended alpha-level of 0.05, and a margin of 
error at 5% (Bartlett and Kotrlik, 2001; Dalen and Ansteensen, 2011). There 
were 2846 organizations with more than 100 employees in Norway in 2011 (SSB, 
2015). Determining the exact number of managers in these organizations is 
challenging, but I am confident that N approximating 400 is high enough to give 
us a representative look at the experience of managers in Norwegian 
organizations. This is supported by theories on survey size for organizational 
studies: With the alpha-level, margin of error and the standard deviation 
observed in the sample of all respondents the sample size present is more than 
adequate to be called representative (Bartlett and Kotrlik, 2001). 
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Throughout the thesis I will use the much tried and tested independent-samples 
t-test to compare the means of the responses from managers in public 
administration and private enterprises. These groups are not believed to 
correlate and should be considered independent, and thus independently tested 
(Zimmerman, 1997). This test is chosen because it is robust against type 1 which 
errors, which is an erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis, provided that 
sample sizes are equal, fairly large (20-30+) and two-tail tested (Sawilowsky and 
Blair, 1992). By looking at managers from "large" organizations I keep the 
sample size equal, large, and minimize the risk for type 1 error. All results will 
be two-tail tested to ensure significant results. It will be noted with an * when 
significance-tests shows that the means of the respondents answers are not 
significantly different enough to safely reject the null-hypothesis.  
3.4 Potential Survey-Technical Sources of Error  
The attitude-statements used to create indexes are parts of a larger battery, and 
represents a small portion the totality of statements the respondents are asked 
about. This kind of design increases the chance for "respondent fatigue" where 
the quality of responses might drop, and lead to the respondents engaging in 
"straight-line-responding" where an overwhelming amount of statements could 
lead the respondents to repeating answers, or don't fully comprehend the issue at 
hand before answering. This could result in him or her copying previous answers 
in a straight-line, compromising the accuracy of the results (Ben-Nun, 2008).  
 
Another risk with a five-point Likert-scale like the ones used here is a central-
tendency bias. The respondents could potentially center their answers toward the 
central alternatives, vary of taking a stand. This bias might lead to answers in 
the middle of the selection and skew the results toward looking more similar 
than they actually are. Another possible source of error is as social desirability 
bias, where the respondents answer what is expected of them and thus can skew 
the responses toward the conservative and "acceptable" alternative.  
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The selection of respondents is another possible source of error. More than one 
top-manager and as many as every third manager from middle management 
could potentially participate from each chapter or organization. This could 
systematic skew the data if some organizations are overrepresented. 
 
These are known issues for companies performing these surveys and they are 
minimized here by breaking up statements into parts, and encouraging brakes 
for the respondent. But still it is worth noting and acknowledging that the 
technical aspects of the survey is a possible source of error and could lead to more 
"conservative"-attitudes than the population actually have.  
3.5 Suggestions for Improvements to the Survey  
Before presenting my findings I will comment on some improvements I would 
have made to the survey to increase our understanding of attitudes toward 
bureaucracy among leaders: 
1. I would have included statements concerning to what degree the 
manager's experience that structural elements contribute to inefficiency 
in their organizations. This would make it possible to gauge whether 
there is a difference between sectors to the degree structural elements 
are limiting managers in their work. 
2. Inefficiency is a recurring challenge for bureaucracies. To better 
understand it I would have included statements concerning the source of 
inefficiency. This would have made it possible to say something about the 
source of inefficiency and compare sectors; additionally we could more 
accurately find if the experienced inefficiency stems from issues related to 
bureaucracy. 
3. It is possible that some managers in the survey are from the same 
chapter. The inability to cap participation from each chapter/organization 
represents a weakness of this study. Provided my own survey I would cap 
the number of respondents from a singular organization to limit the 
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possibility of systematically skewing the data with respondents from one 
organization. 
4. A five-point scale risks that the responses become too centralized. In a 
quest to get nuanced answers we end up with no answers at all, as the 
respondents are not forced to take a stand. To counter the central-
tendency bias a six-point scale could be used to force the respondents to 
take a stand. Alternatively one could present two options in the form of 
examples of managers, and ask the respondents to identify with one of 
them. By creating opposite categories one could get a clearer picture of 
the managers' preferences. While creating accurate and balanced 
examples takes skillful crafting and meticulous work, it would pay off as 
it could emphasize differences to a greater degree than the nuanced five-
point scale. This means that we could not compare the strength of the 
differences between them, but it would be a good tool for comparing 
attitudes between two groups isolated and give us an indication of any 
differences between them. 
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4 Attitudes Toward Bureaucratic 
Structure Among Norwegian Managers 
If public administrations are more rigid and rule-based than their private 
counterparts, we would expect to see differences in managers' attitudes to 
structure. If they are similar, as suggested by previous research, we would expect 
them to be alike in their attitudes toward structure. Based on survey-data I will 
test if there is an observable difference between managers' attitudes to structural 
elements. From this we can learn if managers in public administrations are more 
bureaucratic in a structural sense than managers in private enterprises. This 
will not provide a complete picture of the organizations' structure, but will 
indicate to what degree managers in these organizations experience and impose 
the structural elements of the bureaucratic ideal type in their work. Based on the 
presented research on the relative flexibility of bureaucratic structure I would 
expect small difference between managers across sectors. The following 
hypotheses will be tested: 
 
H0: There are no differences between managers in public administration 
and private enterprises in their attitudes toward bureaucratic structural 
elements.  
H1: Managers in public administration value bureaucratic structural 
elements higher than their private counterparts. 
H2: Managers in private organizations value bureaucratic structural 
elements higher than their public counterparts. 
4.1 Measuring Attitudes Toward Structure 
To test these hypotheses I will use indexes made from survey statements 
measuring degree of uncertainty avoidance, centralization of power/autonomy, 
formalization of work, and structuralizing of subordinate's tasks. These indexes 
are chosen to represent the structural elements of bureaucracy because they to a 
substantial degree correspond with Weber's ideal types. These indexes are put 
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together by AFF's leadership survey and are intended to be used as indexes 
measuring these elements (AFF, 2012).  
 
A test for Cronbach Alpha values has been performed to measure the internal 
consistency of these indexes. All indexes have a Cronbach Alpha value of at least 
0.70, making them satisfactory for comparing groups (Bland and Altman, 1997). 
To test for unidimensionality I conducted a factor analysis showing that these 
four indexes are mainly influenced by a single underlying construct, responsible 
for at least 43% of the variation, and double that of the second most influencing 
factor suggesting unidimensionality (Grau, 2007; Reckase, 1979). The indexes 
show a satisfactory internal consistency and a degree of unidimensionality to the 
extent that they can be used as an index for measuring these attitudes. 
Throughout the thesis I will utilize indexes like these and note when they are 
used. Unless commented they all show at least a satisfactory degree of internal 
consistency (>0.70), and unidimensionality. The questions making up the indexes 
are part of a larger battery of questions, and from this I have selected four 
indexes representing the bureaucratic structural traits. Some indexes from the 
battery were rejected either because they lack high internal consistency 
(Cronbach Alpha <0.7), or unidimensionality. Others were rejected as they did 
not fit the criteria of measuring a Weberian (1991) structural ideal type. All 
statements were answered on scales from 1 ("completely disagree") to 5 
("completely agree"), value 6 ("don't know") is set as missing (Appendix A).  
Uncertainty Avoidance 
"Uncertainty avoidance" measures to what degree managers show attitudes of 
rule adherence. This concerns the importance of rules and following rules in the 
organization and is inspired by Hofstede's (1983) theories on uncertainty 
avoidance. While this category is not explicitly designed for testing bureaucratic 
attitudes, its concern with avoiding uncertainty through rules/instructions goes 
to the heart of Weber's structural ideal type of a "bureaucratic authority"; 
grounded in a principle of "fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are 
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generally ordered by rules" (1991: 196). 
 
Question: Respond to these statements about values concerning your work:   
 It is important that work demands and expectations are detailed and 
explicit so the employee knows what to do. 
 Rules are important because they express to the employee what the 
operation expects of them. 
 Routines are important because they ease the employees' work. 
 Detailed instructions are important for the employees. 
 I expect the employees to accurately follow instructions and procedures. 
Centralization/Autonomy 
"Centralization/Autonomy" measures to what degree managers experience power 
as centralized in their organizations. This goes to Weber's ideal type concerning a 
monocratic head of the organization, and a hierarch based "supervision of the 
lower offices by the higher ones" (1991: 197). The higher authority is clearly 
defined and regulated, without the higher office necessarily being able to take 
over. 
 
Question: Respond to these statements concerning decisions, rules and routines 
in your business: 
 Not much happens in this operation without a manager's consent.  
 People are not encouraged to make their own decisions. 
 Even minor stuff must be referred to a manager higher up in the operation. 
 Associates must confer with the manager before doing anything.  
 All decisions by associates must have the manager's approval. 
Formalization 
"Formalization" touches on some of the same areas as "rule adherence", but is 
more focused on the existence and importance of formalization of rules and them 
being written down. This is another important aspect of Weber's ideal types 
seeing administration as based upon written documents. Instructions should 
follow "general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and 
which can be learned" (Weber, 1991: 198). 
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Question: Respond to these statements concerning decisions, rules and routines 
in your business: 
 This operation has a great amount of written rules and guidelines. 
 A rules and procedures-manual exists and is easily accessible in the 
operation. 
 There is a complete job description for most jobs in the operation.  
 The operation has a written overview over the work-achievement for nearly 
every associate. 
 There is a formal introduction program for new associates.   
Structuralizing 
"Structuralizing" asks to what degree managers shape the work of their 
employees. Weber argued that commands should be given in a "stable way and is 
strictly delimited by rules" (1991: 196). This index to a degree overlaps with both 
rule-adherence and centralization of power, but is nonetheless included as it 
measures an aspect of bureaucratic structure, managerial structuring of tasks, 
that the others fail to fully capture. 
 
Question: Some statements about your relationship to the group you lead: 
 I encourage the use of standardized procedures. 
 I decide what gets done, and how it gets done. 
 I delegate specific tasks to the group members. 
 I plan when the task should be finished.  
 I keep defined standards for performance. 
 I expect the members of the group to follow current rules and regulations. 
 
When working with interconnected items such as structural ideal types creating 
indexes not overlapping to some degree is close to impossible. That said, I am 
confident that these four indexes accomplish to capture the most important 
bureaucratic structural elements. The most obvious structural characteristics left 
out are the elements concerning expert-training and officials working to their full 
capacity (Weber, 1991). Degree of professionalization will be touched upon later, 
and I am confident that the chosen four indexes make it possible to measure to 
what degree managers in public and private organizations have different 
attitudes toward the structural elements of bureaucracy. Each of these scales are 
suitable for measuring attitudes, as they are put together by questions on a 
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comparable scale, measuring a meaningful attitude, and have a total with a high 
internal consistency and unidimensionality (Reid, 2006). 
4.2 Attitudes of Norwegian Managers  
 Large N Mean 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Private Ent. 
100+ 
400 4,04 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
401 3,72 
Centralization/Auton
omy* 
Private Ent. 
100+ 
400 1,96 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
396 1,95 
Formalization Private Ent. 
100+ 
398 3,60 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
394 3,23 
Structuralizing* Private Ent. 
100+ 
380 3,52 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
387 3,45 
*No statistically significant difference between the two. 
 
These responses mean that we can reject both the null hypothesis and the first 
alternative hypothesis. There is no statistically significant difference between 
attitudes of managers toward structuralizing and centralization/autonomy. 
Managers in private enterprises tend to value formalization and uncertainty 
avoidance to a higher degree than managers in public administrations. This 
supports the second alternative hypothesis saying that "Managers in private 
organizations value structural elements of organizations higher than their public 
counterparts". The differences are small (0.32, 0.37), but trend in the same 
direction. This confirms that structure seems to be relatively flexible both among 
organizations and manager's attitudes, and if there is a difference it appears that 
managers in public administrations show less positive attitudes toward 
bureaucratic structure than managers in private enterprises.  
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The attitudes of private and public managers appear to be largely similar, but 
trend toward more positive attitudes toward structure among managers in the 
private sector. This is in line with previous research in the field of organizational 
studies showing that structure seems to be relative between, and internally, in 
organizations (Udy, 1959; Hall, 1963; Pugh et al, 1968; Walton 2005). While this 
similarity is not surprising considering previous research on organizations, it is 
surprising considering the public debate and the classic theorists on bureaucratic 
personality which seems to think that public administration is inherently more 
"bureaucratized" (Merton, 1960; Thompson, 1961). 
  
Contrary to what is proposed by Merton (1960) and Thompson (1961) it does not 
seem that managers in public administrations are more accepting or supportive 
of bureaucratic structure. Their attitudes show that they are similar to managers 
in private enterprises, and in some instances even less positive toward these 
structural elements. This suggests that the perceived lack of efficiency does not 
seem to be created by attitudes managers in public administration have toward 
structure. If public administrations are synonymous with rigidity and control, 
why are their managers equally or less focused on the structural elements? The 
discrepancy between what scholars and society believes about public 
organizations, and what empirical data shows is telling for how we view 
bureaucratic organization with a priori knowledge (Bozeman and Rainey, 1998). 
Before explaining these findings with theories from the organizational research 
field, I will look at what possible underlying factors to sector can tell us about the 
differences between sectors.  
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4.3 Correlations of Possible Underlying Factors 
This result is not likely to stem from gender-differences as they appear be very 
small or non-significant. 
 Are you man or 
woman? N Mean 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Men 1980 3,98 
Women 909 4,05 
Centralization/Auton
omy* 
Men 1978 1,97 
Women 908 1,91 
Formalization* Men 1972 3,28 
Women 901 3,29 
Structuralizing* Men 1923 3,51 
Women 864 3,52 
*No statistically significant difference between the two 
 
By analyzing the structural elements and possible underlying factors such as 
age, gender, organizational size and level of education we can learn if there is a 
correlation between them. The Spearman Correlation Coefficients indicates the 
degree of association between the variables on a scale from negative (-1) to 
positive (1) (Kraemer, 2005). This can indicate if a high value on one variable is 
correlated with a high or low value on another variable. This indicates to what 
degree the variables are associated with each other or not. Association is 
interesting because it shows what underlying factors are associating with what 
answers. While these correlations do not prove causality it can point out where 
the association is stronger and weaker, providing a possibility for comparison.  
 
When we look at the Spearman Correlation Coefficients between gender we see a 
very weak or no significant association (-0.1 to 0.1) between gender and attitudes 
toward structural elements of bureaucracy, suggesting that gender is not 
associated with structural attitudes. Organizational size has a weak association 
with uncertainty avoidance (-0.15) and formalism (0.22), very weak or not 
significantly for the other indexes (-0.1-0.1). This indicates that in larger 
organizations, the manager show less positive attitudes to uncertainty avoidance, 
and more to formalism. There is a stronger association between education and 
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structural traits than size, gender and sector. Education correlates moderately 
negative (-0.41) with uncertainty avoidance and stronger than any other factor 
with structuralizing (-0.17). There is a very weak or no association with the other 
two structural elements and education (-0.1-0.1). This suggests that the more 
educated a manager, the less positively he is towards uncertainty avoidance and 
structuralizing. This association is stronger for education than for the other 
possible underlying variables (size, gender). The exception is formalism, which 
correlates strongest with size (0.22), suggesting that managers in large 
organizations are more influenced by their size than education, gender, and 
sector in their attitudes. The larger an organization, the stronger a manager 
reports positive attitudes toward formalism.  
 
These correlations, with the exception of education on uncertainty avoidance, are 
weak and do not indicate that any of these possible underlying factors have a 
strong correlation with structural elements. However, they do suggest that 
education is an underlying factor that could explain some of the differences 
between the sectors in attitudes toward structural elements of organization; 
higher education means less positive attitudes toward structure. We will come 
back to this when discussing public administrations as professional 
organizations. This effect is stronger for education than gender. This indicates 
that there are some underlying differences between the sectors explaining some, 
but not all, of the variation between them. The following chapter will use 
appropriate theories to provide explanations for the results, and reasons why 
public managers show equal or more negative attitudes toward structural 
elements. 
32 
 
5 Possible Explanations for Attitudes 
Toward Structure 
5.1 Selective Structure 
The attitudes of Norwegian managers confirm previous research on the topic. 
Formalization is generally found to be similar between public and private sectors 
in most instances, weakening the myth of formalization and structural focus 
running amok in the public sector. An explanation for this, supported by US-
data, is that public managers are rather autonomous and experience less 
formalization in the areas where they are in control, but wield less control over 
areas with more extensive external control and oversight, such as purchases and 
personnel. The differences between the sectors are suggested to be due to matters 
outside the agency's hands, and not a weakness of the organizational form itself, 
public managers appear to receive the red-tape more than they create it (Rainey 
and Bozeman, 2000). 
 
Public managers are not more supportive of bureaucratic structure than 
managers in the private sector. A possible explanation, based on Rainey and 
Bozeman's (2000) theories, is that degree of formalization and amount of "red 
tape" are equal between the sectors. It could even be higher in the private sector, 
possibly due to a general lower feeling of oversight and external control in the 
public sector. Unfortunately there is no data on the explicit level of oversight and 
control in this survey. But when we look at a general question of how often public 
managers feel that political decisions make it difficult to work efficiently, we see 
that managers in public administration score substantially higher than 
managers in private enterprises: 
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This indicates that while managers in public administrations are less focused on 
structural elements, they feel more limited by political decision making than 
their private counterparts. This result is not surprising considering that the 
political decision-makers should be considered the owners of public 
administrations and should be instructing them (Hoggett, 2006). Unfortunately, 
there is no data on how private enterprise owners influence the efficiency of their 
organizations. 
 
Peter Blau saw large organizations, including government agencies, as 
"multilevel hierarchies" with each level so far removed from top management, 
and consequently autonomous in their actions, that they "make operations 
relatively self-regulating and independent of direct intervention by management" 
(1968: 453). By seeing public administrations as "multilevel hierarchies", we can 
understand how their managers might report one thing for dealing with their 
own employees on their "own level", and something else for their experience with 
their management-level. Individual managers at each level of the hierarchy 
might not experience their level to be rigid and stringent, as they are a fairly 
independent of the central management, but this does not necessarily mean that 
the hierarchy as a whole equals the individual parts. Managers seem to 
1 2 3 4 5
Public Adm.
Private Ent.
Political decisions limiting efficency 
Political decisions limiting
efficency
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experience less structural elements at their own level, but face more troubles 
with inefficiency when having to confront higher levels, or the totality of the 
hierarchy. This could mean that the individual levels of the hierarchy 
experiences less structuralism, but as each level of hierarchy is added together 
the totality of structuralism could increase, making it possible that the whole 
organization is more formalized in the public sector, while each manager reports 
equal or less levels of formalization at their level. 
 
Lack of oversight of certain areas of public administration could contribute to 
formalization (Rainey and Bozeman, 2000). I can neither confirm nor deny this 
with the data available. It is however clear that managers in public 
administrations report less attitudes of formalization, rule adherence and 
centralization, but they experience more limitations from the political level and 
report to experience more formal rules in the day-to-day operation (4.0>3.8). 
These conflicting reports suggest that while the public managers themselves 
report not to prefer, or impose, structural elements to a higher degree, they deal 
with these issues to a higher degree than managers in private enterprises. This is 
supported empirically by research showing that public organizations are under 
more rule-based control (Boyne, 2002). Managers in public administrations seem 
to be under more control, but prefer less structure indicating that they are not 
more bureaucratic in their attitudes. The comparatively negative attitudes 
toward structural elements among public managers can be explained by them 
having a greater a degree of freedom inside their own level of the hierarchy 
compared to private enterprises. While they receive more directions from above, 
they do not seem to be more bureaucratic in their attitudes toward structure, 
possibly because they have greater freedom in this area (Blau, 1968) 
5.2 Complex Goals and Attitudes Toward Structure 
Attitudes of Norwegian managers confirm previous research suggesting that 
managers in public administration are not the rule-craving bureaucrats they are 
made out to be (Bozeman and Rainey, 1998). They explained this with a 
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connection between goal ambiguity, "red tape", and rule formalization (Rainey, 
Pandey, and Bozeman, 1995). Public sector has been perceived as having more 
complex goals and tasks, hey are tasked with achieving a wide variety of goals 
while taking into account a whole society's worth of interests (Hoggett, 2006). 
From the survey we can learn about goal complexity by measuring how often 
Norwegian managers experience unclear feedback on their work, and troubles 
seeing tasks to completion. While this is not a complete measurement of 
complexity, it points to whether there is a difference between managers in 
private and public organizations to the degree that they experience success as 
hard to measure and completion of tasks as hard to achieve.  
 
When asked about to what degree they receive clear feedback about their work, 
and to what degree they are able to see their work through by finishing started 
tasks, there is a difference in disfavor of the public managers: 
 
 Large N Mean 
Feedback  Private Ent. 
100+ 
401 3,97 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
401 3,67 
Completion of tasks Private Ent. 
100+ 
399 4,05 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
404 3,77 
 
Managers in public administrations report to experience less clear feedback 
about their work, and are to a lesser degree able to complete their tasks. This is 
not unequivocal proof of complexity, but suggests that managers in public 
administration have a harder time identifying a job well done and completing 
tasks. This could be caused by a higher degree of complexity of tasks and unclear 
goals, a prevalent feature of a public sector dealing with a multitude of goals and 
tasks that are difficult to measure and complete (Strand, 2007). 
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By looking at Spearman's correlation between the structural elements and 
reported feedback we can learn how they correlate with each other. There is a 
correlation between feedback and structuralizing (0.23) and completion of tasks 
and structuralizing (0.19). Feedback (0.23) and completion of tasks (0.22) also 
correlated with uncertainty avoidance stronger than with structure and 
formalization. This suggests that managers who experience clear feedback and 
completion of tasks are more positive to structure. They favor clear rules and 
regulations for their employees’ work. This indicates an association between goal 
complexity and structure. While these correlations cannot prove causality, it 
appears that clarity of goals end expectations could be a driving force behind the 
prevalence of structural attitudes.  
 
A possible reason for this is that clearer goals and feedback motivates the 
managers in private enterprises to impose stricter rules. It can be easier to 
structuralize and follow rules and regulations for work that is easy, or even 
possible to complete. This dates back to Arthur Stinchcombe's (1959) research 
regarding craft and professional administrations. He found that instability 
decreases bureaucratization as it is difficult to create and impose rules for 
unclear situations.  
 
Standardizing that which cannot be standardized seems to be a challenge for 
Norwegian managers. Public managers report using less performance measures, 
and less utility from performance goals, suggesting that private managers have 
more measurement and utility of formalized goals. It is not clear if this is a result 
of complexity of tasks, easier targets to measure or other factors. It is however 
clear that public managers are measured on goals to a lesser degree, and have 
less utility of the performance goals presented to them. This can be seen together 
with the difficult of getting feedback and completing tasks as an indication of 
complex goals in public administrations. This complexity is as possible a reason 
for stronger negative attitudes toward structure, and could explain some of the 
attitudes of public managers. 
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5.3 The Fallacy of Alienation  
There is a proposed connection between a feeling of alienation, and the perceived 
need for rules (Foster, 1990). Alienation (powerlessness) has previously been fund 
to be more prevalent in private organization than in public organizations, and 
correlates with a preference of formalization, suggesting that the preference for 
rules are based in the personality of the official and not the structure of the 
organization (Bozeman and Rainey, 1998). Higher demands and focus on 
delivering according to demands might create a more rigid, rule-based system in 
the private sector compared to public administration.  
 
In the survey of Norwegian managers we see that managers in private 
enterprises report a higher degree of facing sanctions if unable to deliver results 
as expected (2.34 v 1.90), but there is none (<0.10) or weak (<0.20) correlation 
between fearing sanctions and the structural elements. This suggests that fear of 
sanctions are less of a factor for structuralizing and rule adherence than clear 
feedback and completion of tasks to Norwegian managers as shown above. 
Unclear goals seems to be a more likely explanation for why public managers 
show less positive attitudes toward the structural elements of bureaucracy than 
ascribing it to a feeling of alienation among managers in private enterprises. 
These differences between US and Norwegian managers could be contributed to 
cultural-differences in the work-place, or other factors making the impact of 
alienation less powerful here.  
5.4 Expectations 
Expectations of structure could play a factor when managers are asked about 
their attitudes. Differing expectations could mean that the attitudes portray a 
difference that is not objectively observable, but only exists as a subjective 
construct. There is not necessarily a relationship between perception and 
measurable objectives. Studies have shown that people let their threshold of "red-
tape" influence their perception of it regardless of the objective amount as people 
can only compare their situation to what they know (Rainey and Bozeman 2000). 
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A possible explanation for the differences between managers in public and 
private organizations could be that the managers in public administration are 
evaluating the structure based on their experiences with surroundings they are 
familiar with. Managers in governmental offices are likely to have a career in the 
organization, and know what rules and structures they can change and what is 
not up for discussion, which may then influence their perceptions and values. 
Their experience with the existing systems could lead to more negative attitudes 
toward structural elements as they take them for granted, and perhaps see them 
as a natural resource, or unavoidable obstacle to their managerial business. On 
the contrary, it is possible that managers in private enterprises expect less rules 
and "red-tape" and therefore feel that the structure in place are more prevalent 
that it really is. Unfortunately, when we measure attitudes, and not objects, we 
cannot know whether these differences are observable or not. Research suggests 
that there is no correlation between the perceived level of red-tape in an 
organization and the actual level of formalization (Pandey, 1995). This weakness 
of survey-data and the effect of expectations could explain the attitudes observed, 
but it does not limit the validity of the experienced level of structure and 
formalism reported by the manager; managers in public administrations report 
less experience of structural formality than managers in private enterprises. 
5.5 Do Professionals Need Less Structure? 
Another possible explanation for the difference in attitudes between public and 
private managers could be that the managers in public administration are 
professionals to a higher degree, and that they do not value the structure as 
much as they value the work; they are primarily educated professionals, and 
then public employees. This explanation is supported by the previously shown 
correlation between education and attitudes to bureaucratic structure. 
 
Structural traits of bureaucracy can be used as management tools to impose 
bureaucratic control; giving managers the authority needed to lead a rational 
organization (Reimann, 1973). The tension between the need for the managers to 
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lead a rational organization, and the need for the professional to act in the 
manner of his profession might collide. Despite these tensions, it is suggested 
that organizations are able to be efficient despite these internal differences 
because of “accommodative mechanisms” (Udy, 1959). These mechanisms can be 
understood as ways rational systems let professionals be professionals while 
staying contained in a system, ensuring that hierarchies are not antagonistic to 
professionals. Professionals can be efficient in hierarchies because they recognize 
that some decisions must be made by others, and because the support provided 
by a hierarchy might aid their work (Hall, 1967). Hierarchical organizations 
show more bureaucratic traits than autonomous organizations, but they are not 
inherently less professional. The "bureaucratic structure", with its normative 
systems, might not limit the professional’s “self-regulatory activity” (Hall, 1967: 
462), as "the occupational base of an organization or an organizational segment 
may influence the structure and norms of the organization" (Hall, 1967: 475), and 
“It might be hypothesized that the more developed the normative system of the 
occupations in an organization, the less the need for a highly bureaucratized 
organizational system” (Hall, 1967: 475). Bureaucratization appears to be merely 
one piece of the puzzle, and far from the only factor limiting or promoting 
professionalization in the organizational setting; professionals are able to thrive 
in bureaucracies. 
 
The AFF-survey confirms that managers with no university education report 
substantially stronger positive attitudes toward structural elements than those 
with a University-degree: 
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 Educational level N Mean 
Formalization Up until University 823 3,40 
4+ Years of 
University 
933 3,20 
Centralization/Auton
omy 
Up until University 828 2,01 
4+ Years of 
University 
936 1,87 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Up until University 833 4,39 
4+ Years of 
University 
938 3,68 
Structuralizing Up until University 793 3,67 
4+ Years of 
University 
909 3,41 
 
The number of managers in large organization without a university-degree 
makes it dubious to compare only managers in large organizations, but the 
general trend is that the more educated a manager is, the more negative he is 
toward structural elements like formalization, centralization, rule-adherence and 
structuralizing. This portrayal of the public manager as a professional, with a 
strong union-presence, has merit as an important contingency for leadership in 
the public sector (Strand, 2007). It can be observed empirically in the leadership 
data, where managers in public organizations report to listen to unions in their 
day-to-day work to a significantly higher degree than managers in private 
enterprises (3.7>3.4). This suggests that managers in public administrations can 
be considered as university-trained "professionals" to a higher degree than 
managers in private enterprises.  
5.5.1 Understanding Autonomy in Bureaucratic Organizations 
Elizabeth Morrissey and Keith F. Gillespie (1975) look at the difference between 
“professional” and “bureaucratic”-organizations, listing multiple dichotomies 
before setting on this as the major difference between them:  
 
Hierarchical authority permeates bureaucracies, and executives typically 
demand from their subordinates compliance to organizational rules and 
procedures. By contrast, professional authority emanates from superior 
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expertise which requires individual autonomy in decision-making and task 
operations.  
(Morrissey and Gillespie, 1975: 320) 
 
The focus on hierarchical versus individual autonomy is interesting. Seeing that 
managers in public administration are equally or more negative to structural 
elements than managers in private enterprises, it is curious to see if this is also 
mirrored in the level of autonomy they experience. Theorizing that one of the 
reasons for this structural leniency is the degree of professionalism, we should 
expect than managers in public administrations do not experience less autonomy 
in their work.  
 
From the AFF-leadership survey, we can study how managers in public and 
private organizations experience their levels of autonomy. An index (Appendix B) 
of statements regarding their degree of autonomy makes it possible to test the 
following hypotheses regarding manager's autonomy in private and public 
organizations: 
 
H0: "There are no differences in the experienced autonomy-levels of 
managers in public administration and private enterprises". 
H1: "Managers in public administration experience a lower degree of 
autonomy than managers in private enterprises". 
H2: "Managers in private enterprises experience a lower degree of autonomy 
than managers in public administration ". 
 
The results show than we can reject the null-hypothesis and accept the first 
alternative hypothesis. Managers in public administrations report a lower level 
of autonomy in their work than managers in private enterprises: 
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 Large N Mean 
Autonomy Private Ent. 
100+ 
401 3,60 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
404 3,09 
 
This suggests that while they report more negative attitudes to structure, they 
also report lower level of autonomy. While managers in public administrations 
are less worried about the structural aspects of their own and subordinates’ 
work, they report to have less autonomy in their own work. 
 
A possible explanation for this could be that managers in public administrations 
have freedom in the way they solve their problems, but the problems they are set 
to solve are less autonomous as a result of them being under political control and 
part of a bigger overlying structure. This organizational duality is described as a 
way for professionals to operate in a hierarchical system (Francis and Stone, 
1956). While public managers appear less worried about structural elements, 
they also report less autonomy to form their own work; possibly due to control 
and instructions from the political level. It has been suggested by multiple 
theorists that this duality is a source of strength for the public administration. 
The freedom created by the structure and formalizations ensures the official 
freedom to decide, while limiting arbitrary decision-making (Goodsell, 2014; 
Hoggett, 2006). Public administrations are political tools (Strand, 2007); 
managers are set to carry out decisions, and while they are less able to formulate 
what those decisions are compared to their private counterparts, they appear 
more willing to involve their subordinates in how these tasks should be carried 
out.  
 
Managers in public administrations show traits of a professional working in a 
hierarchical system (Francis and Stone, 1956). The public managers appear to fit 
better into a category of professional bureaucrats than an administrating, 
classical, bureaucrat (Strand, 2007). With this understanding, it is erroneous to 
suggest that public administrations are bureaucratic organizations to a higher 
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degree than private enterprises. The freedom to choose goals appears more 
limited, but this does not seem to indicate more structural rigidity among the 
managers. Rigidity of goals and less autonomy allows the public organizations to 
operate with the stability necessary for carrying out public service, while staying 
flexible enough to perform the job to the expectations and resources available to 
the manager (Strand, 2007; Clegg et al, 2011). 
 
Degree of professionalism and education is a possible explanation for structural 
attitudes. Managers in public administration are more educated, appears to be 
more "professionals", and this can partly explain their attitudes to bureaucratic 
structure. 
5.6 Organizations are Becoming More Alike  
Organizational homogeneity could explain the relative similarity between 
managers in public administration and private enterprises. The trend of 
organizations generally becoming more alike is proposed as a result of changing 
rationale for structural elements (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Weber (1991) 
argued that structure was based in rationality, changing due to competition and 
performance needs. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1983) argue that 
contemporary organizations change due to reasons in their organizational field, 
and as a result become more alike, though not necessarily more efficient. The 
reasons for changing are anchored in the organizational fields, where 
organizations become increasingly alike as they depend more on each other and 
actors in the field. As a result, there is a path-dependency to organizational form; 
the ones who are chosen and successful will be imitated. This has been observed 
in organizations as they become increasingly similar when they interact with 
each other (Marsden, 1999). 
 
If organizations are becoming more alike due to organizational fields it can 
explain the relative equality in attitudes to structure between managers in 
private and public organizations. As fields become more and more interdependent 
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and affect each other across sectors (Strand, 2007), it becomes increasingly likely 
that the structural attitudes of private and public organizations become similar, 
making it less of a surprise that managers in public administration appears to be 
structurally less bureaucratic than private enterprises. 
 
Another aspect of this is that an increasing prevalence of "soft-control", and 
project-work might contribute to less formal-control through structures overall 
(Raelin, 2010). The increased popularity of these informal ways of coordination 
might lead to a uniformity of organizational types. If project-work is becoming as 
common in the public sector as in the private, it stands to reason that the levels 
of formal structural attitudes would become similar between the sectors.  
This movement toward more similar organizational forms is predicted by Weber 
(1991) as a possible development for bureaucracy. As previously discussed, he 
saw the speed and accuracy of the organizational form in a world demanding 
these qualities as a reason for its continuing prevalence. The fact that we now 
100 years later can spot these trends among managers might indicate that 
Weber's theories on this issue where correct; the utility and flexibility of the 
bureaucratic organizational form has made it a staple of organizations in all 
sectors, and this can be observed among its managers. 
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6 Implications of Structural Attitudes 
The previous chapter presented that managers in Norwegian public 
administration are equal or less positive in their attitudes to structural elements 
than managers in private enterprises. This was explained by looking at previous 
research and theories concerning public sector and structure. This section will 
discuss the implications of my findings: 
6.1 Public Administrations do not Bureaucratize 
Managers 
Robert K. Merton claimed that the "bureaucratic structure exerts a constant 
pressure upon the official to be 'methodical, prudent, and disciplined'" (1960: 
562), and that pressure from the social structure can lead to the official becoming 
overly rigid and overly concerned with rules and structure. Victor Thompson 
(1961) proposed that managers in classical bureaucracies who are removed from 
their specialization and facing unclear demands become insecure, creating 
"bureaupathology", a breeding ground for control-oriented behavior. While 
Thompson ascribes these problems to the individual, they are believed to be 
systematic as the classical bureaucracy promotes them (Bozeman and Rainey, 
1998).  
 
The attitudes toward structural elements suggest that there is no more 
"bureaucratizing" of the public manager than the private. To further hammer 
home this point we can look at an index of questions measuring "power distance" 
(Appendix C) defined in the following way:  
 
In organizations, the level of Power Distance is related to the degree of 
centralization of authority and the degree of autocratic leadership. This 
relationship shows that centralization and autocratic leadership are rooted 
in the "mental programming" of the members of a society.  
(Hofstede, 1983: 81) 
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Power-distance in this survey measures to what degree the manager supports 
centralization of power and autocratic leadership. This distance is proposed to be 
represented in both formal and informal hierarchies inside the organization 
(Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011). I did not include this as an element in my 
discussion on structural elements of bureaucracy as the power distance is more a 
suggested adverse effect of bureaucracy than a defined ideal type of it (Merton, 
1960; Weber, 1991). Another reason for not including it in the main analysis is 
that it has a lower internal consistency than the threshold (Cronbach 
Alpha=0.67). This level is not critically low, and factor-analysis shows that it is 
unidimensional.  
 
The attitudes of Norwegian managers show that managers in private enterprises 
show attitudes of power distance to a higher degree than managers in public 
administrations (1.88>1.68), further suggesting that the control-oriented 
bureaucrats described by Merton (1960) are more prevalent in the private sector 
than in public administration. 
 
The attitudes of Norwegian managers suggest that there is less 
"bureaupathology" among managers in public administrations compared to 
private enterprises; public managers prefer and experience less rules and 
structure. This indicates that public administrations have less rule-focused 
officials than private organizations, and should dispel the myth of the public 
administration as craving rules and control as an inherent value in and of itself. 
There is no empirical data suggesting that Norwegian managers in public 
administration are more structurally bureaucratic than managers in private 
enterprises. If the bureaucratic structure exerts a kind of pressure it does not 
seem to influence the managers at all, contrary it may seem that managers in 
public administrations receive more instructions and procedures from above, but 
that they prefer to not pass this on to their associates. 
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6.2 Public Administrations are Less Bureaucratic 
Than Believed 
A staple of organizational culture-theory is that culture can be learned in an 
organization. It has been suggested by several scholars that work environment 
influences personal values. This is done through organizational learning in an 
"organization socialization"- process where the individual learns the normative 
behaviors, attitudes, and values expected of him as a new member of the 
organization or group (Weiss, 1978; Van Maanen and Schein, 1979). Specifically 
to bureaucracy, it has been suggested that professionals learn to adapt certain 
bureaucratic values (Hall, 1967). It has been posited that old values are 
unlearned so that members of organizations can learn new values in the new 
organization through a process of events (Schein, 2003). 
 
If we presume that "organizational socialization" happens in organizations, 
either through imitation of models or other means, one would expect members of 
a bureaucratic organization to show stronger bureaucratic attitudes than 
members of non-bureaucratic organizations (Weiss, 1978). Taking "organizational 
socialization" into account it can be argued that managers' equal, or stronger 
negative attitudes to structural elements of bureaucracy, suggest that there is no 
basis for saying that they are members of more bureaucratic organizations in a 
structural sense. 
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7 Attitudes Toward Bureaucratic 
Values Among Norwegian Managers 
"The goal of formal rational behavior is to maximize predictability and minimize 
personal preferences" (Bartels 2009: 460). 
 
The value-perspective of bureaucratic theory could elaborate on the attitudes to 
structure as it proposes that differences in the structural ideal types are ill-
equipped for telling us whether these organizations are bureaucratic at all, and 
that we must consider other elements to understand bureaucracy (Bartels, 
2009). Data from Norwegian managers, as well as previous research (Udy, 
1959; Hall, 1963; Walton, 2005) suggests that structurally there is no empirical 
reason for painting public administrations as more bureaucratic. And the 
value-approach would say that this is because there are no structural 
differences between them, and the important difference lays in the values they 
keep. This could mean that managers in public administrations are less 
positive to bureaucratic structure than managers in private organizations, or 
that structure in general is a poor indicator of bureaucracy: "neither the issue 
of centralization-distribution of authority nor that of standardization can be 
made the yardstick for deciding the limits of the bureaucratic form" 
(Kallinikos, 2004: 18). 
 
By claiming that the structural ideal types do not indicate degree of 
bureaucracy, we need to look deeper to detect what does. An alternative 
approach is to look beyond structure, and to the values filling the structure as 
the defining quality of bureaucracy; network-organizations might differ from 
classical bureaucratic-organizations in their structure, but that does not make 
them less bureaucratic, just different (Kallinikos, 2003). Kallinikos bases this 
on the fact that the centralization of an organization is not as crucial for the 
bureaucratic form as the "legal-rational type authority, separation of office 
duties and personal life, meritocracy and universalism" (2003: 9). Looking 
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different from the classical bureaucracy does not necessarily make them 
different. Adaption to the environment does not make them less bureaucratic 
as long as they carry with them bureaucratic values.  
 
Koen Bartels argues that most of the criticism toward bureaucracies is based on 
what he calls "new conventional wisdoms" (2009: 447), which uses Weber's ideal 
types to focus on structural problems of underperformance such as rigidity and 
infectivity. He rejects the notion of rigidity due to structure and formality as a 
new wave of misunderstandings of Weber's theories, not unlike the criticism of 
ideal types (Bartels, 2009). Based on limited readings and misunderstandings of 
Weber, they equate formal rationality with rules and control. It is taken for 
granted that a bureaucratic structure creates inefficiency in its workers by the 
way of formal rationality (Bartels, 2009; Osborne and Plastrik, 1997).  
 
Data from Norwegian managers, as well as earlier studies, fails to detect a clear 
difference between public and private organizations with regards to bureaucratic 
structure. If we cannot find that public administrations are structurally more 
bureaucratic, is it possible to find differences in the values they fill their 
structures with? To test this, I will focus on the experience of the managers and 
see if there is a value-based bureaucratic ethos separating managers in public 
and private organizations. I will also look if there appears to be a significant 
difference in the degree of "public values" shown by managers in their daily work. 
To measure f public managers truly are less willing to adapt and less "modern" I 
will measure "post-bureaucratic"-values. This will not be, or even try to be, a 
comprehensive list of bureaucratic values, but an effort to describe a dichotomy 
between managers in public and private organizations. By looking beyond 
structural attitudes of Norwegian public and private managers we can identify if 
they are different regarding bureaucratic values. 
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7.1 Bureaucratic Ethos and Formal/Substantive 
Rationality 
An important aspect of bureaucratic values is the bureaucratic ethos; following 
orders and separating their own convictions for those of the position. This allows 
the bureaucrat to separate himself from his position, and makes it possible to 
keep his freedom as he enters the role of public servant. By uniting the formal 
and substantive rationality he is able to function in the role, formally separated 
from the person. To illustrate it with Weber's own words, a bureaucrat:  
 
takes pride in preserving his impartiality, overcoming his own inclinations 
and opinions, so as to execute in a conscientious and meaningful way what 
is required of him by the general definition of his duties or by some 
particular instruction, even—and particularly—when they do not coincide 
with his own political views.  
(Weber, 1994a: 160) 
 
While doing this the bureaucrat is not limited from individual decision-making, 
but he is supposed to follows orders even if they are against his convictions 
(Weber, 1994a; Weber, 1994b). This is done by uniting the substantive and 
formal rationality through the bureaucratic ethos (Bartels, 2009). Paul Du Gay 
argues that the bureaucratic ethos makes it possible to separate person and role 
and facilitates an "impartial and efficient administration" (2008: 339). A central 
bureaucratic value is the ability to follow orders from above no matter the 
personal "inclinations and opinions" (Weber, 1994a: 160) 
 
To what extent do Norwegian manager's attitudes reflect the bureaucratic ethos? 
Are there differences between public administrations and public enterprises in 
this regard? The AFF leadership study is able to tell us to what degree managers 
must carry out decisions going against their professional competence, and to 
what degree they must make decisions going against their own ethics and values. 
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These two questions make it possible to test hypotheses about the bureaucratic 
ethos of public and private managers: 
 
H0: "There is no difference in how often managers in private enterprises 
and public administration reports going against their own convictions". 
H1: "Managers in public administration reports going against their own 
convictions more often than managers in private enterprises". 
 
 Large N Mean 
Going against professional 
competence 
Private Ent. 
100+ 
397 2,36 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
399 2,72 
Going against personal 
ethic and values 
Private Ent. 
100+ 
395 1,76 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
401 1,89 
 
The respondents indicate that I can safely reject the null-hypothesis: there is a 
difference between the two sectors to the degree managers report going against 
their own convictions. We can accept the first alternative hypothesis saying that 
managers in public administrations indicate that they to a higher degree 
experience having to go against their personal convictions in their work life. This 
suggests that the bureaucratic ethos, as Weber envisioned it, exists to a higher 
degree in Norwegian public administration than in private enterprises. The 
reasons for this could be many, and worthwhile looking into for future projects. 
Possible explanations include that this is expected of managers in public sector to 
a higher degree, or that the interference they report from above them in the 
hierarchy and political level binds them to carry out decisions they do not agree 
with, but have to comply with. While I cannot prove Du Gay's (2008) theories on 
the importance of the bureaucratic ethos, I can say that managers in public 
administration report to more often behaving in accordance to these values than 
managers in private enterprises.  
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These results are not unique as it has been argued that the appearance of a 
bureaucratic ethos separates public and private sector (Du Gay 2000; Olsen 
2006): 
 
Bureaucracy has a role as the institutional custodian of democratic-
constitutive principles and procedural rationality, even if in competition 
with other institutions embedding competing criteria of success 
Bureaucracy also has a role as a tool for legislators and representative 
democracy and is positively related to substantive outcomes that are valued 
in contemporary democracies, by some more than others.  
(Olsen, 2006: 18) 
 
The public service side of public administration makes it absolutely necessary 
with a bureaucratic ethos separating the individual from the role. It preserves 
the officials' freedom, and secures the public from unjust actions (Bartels, 2009). 
These values are the elements that make an organization able to serve without 
becoming a maligned force (Clegg et al, 2011). 
 
By understanding the bureaucratic ethos as one module of the "modular man" 
(Gellner, 1996) we can explain how the official can separate his private self from 
the ethical demands and duties of the office. This allows a separation of person 
and role in the organization. An official should care for those he is serving, but 
only in the capacity of his role as a public official and within the regulations (Du 
Gay, 2008). The bureaucratic ethos is conservative. It has to be to protect itself 
from special interests and short-term personal gains at the cost of long-term 
public effectiveness (Du Gay, 2008). When the bureaucrat is no longer performing 
according to his role, but person, thus breaking the bureaucratic ethos, he stops 
being an efficient tool and can no longer be considered a bureaucrat, but a rogue 
official.  
 
Weber has already argued for the official as not simply a machine, but someone 
who makes his own decisions within the rules (Weber, 1994a: 160). A case worker 
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making subjective determination according to instructions is still a bureaucrat, 
but a case worker making up his own instructions and demands for helping a 
client is rogue, and not performing his duties according to the bureaucratic ethos. 
He no longer separates between his person and his role. A stronger bureaucratic 
ethos for managers in public administrations is a strength and necessity as they 
ensure that the manager is anchoring his business in the rational instructions 
given to him. 
7.2 Public Interests Versus Organizational Interests 
Research done on US public officials in the 1950s found that officials stray away 
from written instructions when they feel they have skills permitting it, are short 
on time, or because of demands for productivity and cultural factors (Francis and 
Stone, 1956). From this they gather that "conflicting or competing forces are 
operating within and among the employees" (Francis and Stone, 1956: 129). 
Employees felt they had the competence to break the norms when they needed to, 
suggesting that public administration showed traits of a professional 
organization. Bureaucracies see the individual as subordinate to the system, but 
the professional organization sees the system subordinate to the professional, so 
these two traditions are able to coexist in varying degrees within the same 
system because they are "not types of organization, but principles of 
organization" (Francis and Stone, 1956, 157). Hospitals are used as an example of 
a hierarchical structure, with doctors and nurses who are seen as professionals in 
their field; "while the professional is supposed to treat each client as unique, and 
therefore the relation is individual, his obligation remains to the code of rules 
which determines the relation" (Francis and Stone, 1956: 164). The professional 
can function in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and the limiting of autonomy is 
necessary and useful for the organization as has been discussed earlier. 
 
Knowing this, can we observe a difference among managers in private and public 
organizations regarding the degree of which they take into account "public 
values"? By looking at how they balance the needs of the public with the needs of 
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their organization, we can see if managers in public administrations are more 
like professional organizations with a goal of service, or rational actors worried 
about their organizational goals. A survey-question concerning to what degree 
the managers seek to balance organizational interests with public interests 
would give us an indication of how they view the importance of organizational 
goals compared to public values: 
 
  Large N Mean 
Balancing 
organizational 
interests with public 
interests. 
Private Ent. 
100+ 
387 3,41 
Public Adm. 
100+ 
360 3,99 
 
It appears that managers in public administrations to a higher degree seek to 
balance organizational interests with public interests, suggesting that we can 
understand them as professional organizations trying to balance organizational, 
rational goals with a broader value of public interest to a higher degree than 
managers in private enterprises. The tension between acting as a professional, 
and following rules is apparent in that public managers both goes against 
professional competence, and seems to take into account a broader perspective 
(public-values) in their daily work than private managers. This result is not 
surprising considering that public enterprises are orientated toward public 
service as they are supposed to serve the public (Clegg, et al, 2011). While not 
surprising, it is interesting to view data showing that leaders in public 
administrations appear to balance public values with organizational values to a 
higher degree than private managers, while at the same time behaving like 
professional actors to some degree. This supports the public manager as a duality 
of both bureaucratic and professional values, uniting in the manager as a 
professional bureaucrat (Strand, 2007). 
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7.3 A Note on the Relationship Between 
Bureaucratic Structure and Values 
By looking at how attitudes to structural elements associate with values, we can 
learn about the relationship between bureaucratic structure and values. 
Spearman's rank correlation suggests that sector (0.18) associates stronger with 
going against professional competence than size (0.11), education (0.06) and 
gender (0.04). This sector association is matched by the association between 
attitudes toward centralism/autonomy (0.20), but no other structural attitudes. 
This indicates that these bureaucratic values correlate positively with a high 
score on sector (public administration) and positive attitudes toward centralism, 
but not the other structural elements. 
  
These are all weak association numbers, but they do suggest that sector has a 
stronger effect than size, education and gender combined when it comes to 
managers' bureaucratic values. It also shows that the structural elements of 
centralism correlate with values, suggesting that there is a connection between 
attitudes to centralism and bureaucratic values. I found no correlations for going 
against ethical-values (-0.1 to 0.1) besides centralism (0.18), again suggesting 
that the structural aspect of centralism could be a contingency-factor for a 
bureaucratic ethos to a similar degree as working in public administration. 
 
When looking at Spearman's rank correlations between the structural elements 
and public values we find that structuralizing (0.12) and formalization (0.13) 
correlates weakly; the other structural attitudes very weak or not at all (-0.1 to 
0.1). The correlation between structuralizing and formalization is weaker than 
that of sector (0.23), suggesting that structure is not the only, or necessarily the 
strongest, carrier of bureaucratic values. 
 
Managers who fear sanctions for not performing their work are more likely to 
complete tasks going against personal convictions. This is partly supported by 
the correlation between fear of sanctions and going against professional 
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convictions (0.15), as well at ethical convictions (0.16). This suggests that 
prevalence of the bureaucratic ethos can be explained to some degree by fear of 
sanctions. The bureaucratic ethos is more prevalent among managers in public 
administration, and the reasons for it appear to be more complex than attitudes 
to structural elements of bureaucracy. 
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8 "New" Bureaucratic Values? 
Weber's ideal types have been described as incomplete, a check-list, not a theory. 
As a result it is possible that the hegemonic-power of the classic ideal types have 
led to other ideal types being ignored (Höpfl, 2006). The vagueness and 
incompleteness of Weber's ideal types makes it well worth thinking about, and 
testing, for ideal types not encapsulated by Weber's. If we are not dealing with a 
pre or post-bureaucracy as the ideas always were incomplete, and a theory more 
than a check-list, it is time to add some contemporary theories to the existing 
corpus of work. Instead of treating Weber as gospel we might be better served 
treating him as a starting and not an end-point. There is a risk that the existing 
ideal types are so universal and based on age-old qualities of hierarchies that is 
not fully modern, post-modern, nor able to separate hierarchical organizations.  
 
The structural ideal types are in many ways descriptions of what makes 
organizations work well, and they are largely based on hierarchical-traits that 
have always worked (Höpfl, 2006). Empirical data suggests that these structural 
ideal types are not as telling as one would like. This might lead to a conclusion 
that everything is structural bureaucratic according to the ideal types, and that 
the only true difference between the old and the new lay not in the structural 
ideal types but the bureaucratic values of separation of role and person, 
monocratic-nature, and its anchoring in rationality. The structural ideal types 
can therefore largely be seen as general for every hierarchy more than an ideal 
type of bureaucratic organizations. It has been suggested that separation 
between individual and organization is the "cornerstone of bureaucracy" 
(Kallinikos, 2004: 19) and further research into possible values might enlighten 
research on bureaucratic organizations further.  
 
Weber's characteristic must be understood as examples of a most distinctive 
possibility, not as an accurate description of what a bureaucratic organization 
should look like. Peter Blau argues against the utility empirical testing of 
Weber's ideal type when he claims empirical testing while take away its purity, 
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while updating it with empirical data will "become a meaningless construct" 
(1963: 311). The testing and updating of these ideal types might weaken the ideal 
type itself, but if that comes with a greater, more precise way, of describing 
rational-legal organizations it seems like a small price to pay. The classic ideal 
types will not vanish, Weber's words will always be there, and we can look back 
and see what is still accurate and what is not.  
 
As an effort to broaden the understandings of public administrations I will look 
at attitudes of employee-involvement and communication with stakeholders to 
learn if these values are more or less prevalent in the public sector. These two 
components are chosen because they are believed to be a staple of a "post-
bureaucratic"-movement, and have been suggested as a wave of new-public 
service values (Kernaghan, 2000). I do not set out to test the legitimacy of 
"post-bureaucracy", but rather test a few of these proposed values to see if any 
of them are more prevalent among managers in public administrations. The 
results will indicate whether public managers are more or less "up-to date" in 
their organizational attitudes. If we make the presumption that these values 
are "modern", not necessarily in their origin, but in their popularity, they can 
indicate to what degree public managers are adaptable and staying current. 
8.1 Involvement of Employees 
Leadership attitudes to cooperation and input from subordinates could indicate 
whether managers in public administration, differ from managers in private 
enterprises regarding how much the members of an organization are able to 
influence organizational matters. This can be and indicator of to what degree 
public administrations should be understood as more or less like "machine-
bureaucracies" compared to private enterprises. If public administrations to a 
higher degree are classic bureaucratic organizations we would expect to see their 
managers indicate that "Positions are specified, roles are defined, and role 
relationships are prescribed independent of the personal attributes of 
participants" (Scott, 1981: 62). I propose that by seeing if there is a difference 
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between how managers in private administrations and public enterprises 
incorporate suggestions and input from their subordinates it is possible to 
identify if we should understand their organizations as more machine- 
bureaucratic or professional. If public administrations are truly more machine-
bureaucratic and set in their "old" ways, one would expect lower scores on 
involvement. The level of involvement from employees and subsequently the 
degree of professionalism can be seen by how managers respond to indexes 
pertaining to questions about the degree their subordinates contribute with new 
ideas/solutions, and to what degree there is an environment of cooperation, dialog 
in organizational activities. Four Indexes measuring the attitudes of leaders, and 
their relationship to their employees (Appendix D) are presented here together 
with two statements regarding level of involvement: 
 
 Large N Mean 
Subordinate Innovation  Private Ent. 100+ 
392 3,78 
Public Adm. 100+ 401 3,96 
Subordinate: Co-
operative conflict style* 
Private Ent. 100+ 
393 3,41 
Public Adm. 100+ 399 3,48 
Manager: Compromising 
conflict style* 
Private Ent. 100+ 
393 3,35 
Public Adm. 100+ 394 3,44 
Subordinate: 
Compromising conflict 
style * 
Private Ent. 100+ 
392 3,17 
Public Adm. 100+ 397 3,20 
I make decisions together 
with my employees 
Private Ent. 100+ 
399 4,11 
Public Adm. 100+ 401 4,27 
I allow my employees to 
perform tasks their way 
Private Ent. 100+ 
398 4,09 
Public Adm. 100+ 400 4,21 
*No statistically significant difference between the two. 
 
Managers in public administrations report involving their employees in 
organizational affairs to a higher degree. This trend was also identified in a 
Swedish study on the involvement of public versus private employees (Tengblad, 
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2006). From the results, it is apparent that public administrations and private 
enterprises are at least equally involving their employees in organizational 
activities. The responses from the managers suggest that public administrations 
should not be considered as more machine-bureaucratic than private enterprises, 
and they seem to portray "modern post-bureaucratic"-values to the same degree.  
8.2 Communicating with Stakeholders  
Public managers report to spend most of their time on being spokesmen for their 
organizations, whereas private managers do not. When asked to consider their 
daily work, managers in public administrations report taking into consideration 
the reputation of their operation in the media (4.1>3.8), as well as their personal 
reputation in their industry (3.8>3.7) to a small, but significantly higher degree 
than managers in large private enterprises. There is no significant difference in 
how they consider input from customers/users and owners, but managers in 
public organizations report to take into consideration input from their partners to 
a small, but significantly higher degree (3.9>3.8). Managers in public 
administration report to spend an equal amount or more time on communicating 
and orientation towards their stakeholders compared to managers in private 
enterprises. Managers in public administration seem willing and able to listen, 
suggesting that we should see them as actors in an organization more complex 
and open than the classical bureaucracy.  
 
This small look into the "post-bureaucratic"-values discerns that leaders in public 
administrations seem to reflect similar or even more values fitting the notion 
"post-bureaucratic". This thesis' scope does not include testing "post-bureaucracy" 
as an organizational form, but by looking at managers in public and private 
organizations it is apparent that public administration in this small sample 
appears to be just as much following the trends of organizational forms as private 
enterprises. This suggest that these leaders are able to adapt, and the classical 
argument of public administration as less able, or willing, to adapt than private 
enterprises seems to be unfit for describing the attitudes of public managers. 
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9 Implications of Attitudes Toward 
Bureaucratic Values 
The previous section has shown that managers in public administrations appear 
to have a stronger bureaucratic ethos, they balance public values with 
organizational goals, and display more "post-bureaucratic"-values such as 
communicating with their surroundings and involvement of employees. The 
following section will discuss the implications of these results.  
9.1 Managers in Public Administrations Have More 
Bureaucratic Values  
Defining bureaucracies as structure, we find no reason for claiming that 
managers in public administrations are more bureaucratic. If we view 
bureaucracy as values, there seems to be a stronger bureaucratic ethos and 
concern with balancing organizational and public interests among managers in 
public administration. This suggests that the "public administration"-view on 
leadership, claiming a profound difference between public and private managers 
seems to be correct regarding values (Byrkjeflot, 2008). Structurally, these 
differences appear to be based on contingencies and not sector. However, when 
we look at the values portrayed in the sector and how managers spend their time, 
we sense that public managers show a stronger degree of a bureaucratic ethos 
and balancing public and organizational interests. This is to be expected as 
public managers perform public tasks. 
 
The prevalence of "post-bureaucratic" values among managers of public 
administration suggests that the notion of public leaders as unwilling to adapt is 
false. This is not to say that "post-bureaucracy" is truly new, but it shows that 
public managers seem to adapt and reflect values that are seen as contemporary 
and "modern" to the same, or even a higher, degree than private managers. 
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The bureaucratic ethos is stronger among public managers, suggesting that 
following orders going against professional competence happens more frequently 
in public administrations. The causality behind these bureaucratic values are 
impossible to determine with my data, but Spearman's rank correlation suggests 
that sector (0.18) associates strongest with going against professional competence 
and balancing interests (0.23). There is a stronger association between sector and 
bureaucratic values than gender, organizational size, length of education and 
age. For some reason it appears that public sector managers report bureaucratic 
values to a higher degree than managers in private enterprises. This is likely due 
to a combination of underlying factors, but it cannot be explained by gender, size, 
education and age alone. This suggests that there must be something else, 
perhaps the educational-type beyond level, or systematic recruitment of 
managers who portray and support these bureaucratic values. The notion of 
managers recruiting people with a shared background, gender and education is 
called "homosociality", and could explain to a certain degree how these values are 
transferred and carried in the organizations (Kanter, 2007).  
 
Managers in public administrations seek to balance their own interests with 
those of the public to a higher degree than private managers. This supports the 
theory that public administration can be seen more as professional actors than 
purely rational actors seeking their own organizational survival. This is of course 
complicated by the fact that the rational directive of public administration is to 
prioritize public needs. Nonetheless, it suggests that managers in public 
administrations can be considered more bureaucratic in the values they portray.  
9.2 Why Bureaucratic Values Matter 
While the bureaucratic values make public managers more "bureaucratic", their 
adaption of "modern" organizational values such as post-bureaucratic 
communication and involvement seem to emphasize that bureaucratic should not 
be equated with old-fashioned or unadaptable. By seeing the bureaucratic values 
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as necessary for performing public service, the term "bureaucratic" can escape 
the connotations of being inefficient and unable to adapt. 
 
The value of bureaucratic ethos is important as it makes the official able to 
function as the political instrument he is supposed to be (Du Gay, 2008). By 
combining the official's knowledge with a direction from the political level, it is 
possible to create efficient carriers of policy. The fact that officials show values 
like the bureaucratic ethos demonstrates that they make decisions independent 
of his or her personal attitudes or beliefs/values. This is a strength for public 
administrations as it allows them to be efficient tools for the political level.  
 
Bureaucratic values exist to a larger degree among managers in public 
administrations, and they seem to be apparent in the sector at the least partly 
independent of bureaucratic formal structure. They could be carried by 
organizational culture or informal hierarchy, or by other mechanisms. I have 
argued that attitudes toward structure are not stronger among managers in 
public administrations compared to private enterprises. This suggests that 
structure is not as big a reason for the perceived inefficiency of public 
administration as its critic suggest.  
 
Bureaucracy is seen as a prerequisite for good government (Friedrich, 1950), 
Weber himself saw bureaucracy as a natural partner to mass democracy, as they 
both represent a historic break with a culture of feudal, patrimonial and 
plutocratic privileges for administrators (1991). The value-aspect of bureaucracy 
is crucial for good public administration, as it brings with it crucial moral 
elements (Hunter, 1994; Du Gay, 2008). If public administrations do not carry 
these values, we run a risk of having a rogue bureaucracy with self-interests 
ruling over public interests. Critics of bureaucracy prefer to focus on the 
structural aspects of bureaucracy as inefficient, thereby fully ignoring the 
important inherent values embedded in the bureaucracy. While this thesis 
argues that the formal structure is not more important for the day-to-day 
operation of the public manager, and as a continuation not necessarily limiting 
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efficiency in the public sector, I do not propose that structure and formal rules 
are unimportant. It has been argued that simple structural elements like taking 
notes are important for upholding bureaucratic values (Byrkjeflot and Du Gay, 
2012). Guy B. Peters (2003) argues that the end of structure is not necessarily an 
end to public values. Industrial countries are seen as able to weaken the 
bureaucratic structures without weakening bureaucratic values, as these values 
are already permeated in the organization and they will not disappear with the 
formalized structure. I am not arguing for a decoupling of structure or values as 
much as showing that attitudes of structure and values do not appear to correlate 
strongly. Thus, the structural ideal types might not fully explain the bureaucratic 
values found in managers of contemporary public administrations, nor define its 
contribution to public administration. 
 
Managers in public administrations appear to be less structurally bureaucratic 
and more value-bureaucratic than managers in private enterprises. This suggests 
that the values are not carried solely by structure. As a result, public 
administrations could be able to adapt to the environment more than we give 
them credit for, and while modernization reforms might change the way they 
look, they will not necessarily affect the important values they carry with them. 
9.3 Possible Carriers of Bureaucratic Values 
As we have seen, evidence indicates that bureaucratic values are loosely coupled 
with attitudes to structure, which other mechanisms in the organizations could 
be carrying these values?  
 
A possible explanation posited by scholars is that organizational culture carries 
these bureaucratic values (Parker and Bradley, 2000). The flexibility of structure 
suggests that culture, rather than leadership attitudes toward a bureaucratic 
structure, is the more likely explanation for the continuance of these 
bureaucratic values.  
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An alternative carrier of bureaucratic values in a diminishing structural 
environment is informal hierarchies. Hierarchical elements appear to be an 
underlying constant quality of organizations. When there is a decline of formal 
hierarchy, it is suggested that informal hierarchy takes over to keep the total 
amount of hierarchy constant (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011). Formal hierarchy 
is grounded in what I have described as bureaucratic structural elements, while 
informal hierarchy is rooted in social relationships over time. Thus, even classical 
bureaucratic organizations have some room for informal hierarchies. These 
informal hierarchies flow from the formal hierarchy, but are from social 
relationships internally in each unit of the bureaucratic organization rather than 
from the top (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011). The replacement of formal 
hierarchies with informal ones could explain how bureaucratic values can be 
carried on in organizations even as bureaucratic structure weakens. 
 
The dynamic of structure and social actors is a recurring theme in sociology. The 
relationship between structure and autonomy is complicated as structure implies 
less autonomy for social actors. It also implies stability as the structure appears 
to be given. To be able to understand values as decoupled from structure we need 
to understand how social actors can influence structures and move away from 
seeing structure as limiting (Sewell Jr, 1992). Building on Anthony Giddens and 
Pierre Bourdieu, William H. Sewell suggests that structure is flexible and can be 
changed: 
 
…the same resourceful agency that sustains the reproduction of structures 
also makes possible their transformation-by means of transpositions of 
schemas and remobilizations of resources that make the new structures 
recognizable as transformations of the old.  
(Sewell Jr, 1992: 27) 
 
The same resources that the structure is facilitating can be reapplied to changing 
the structure based the actions of social actors (officials). It is a reciprocal 
relationship where the social actors utilize structure to change structure. By 
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seeing the structure as possible to influence, we can further understand how the 
values carried by the culture and social actors can influence the structure of an 
organization. This type of relationship between structure and values is critical for 
the notion that values are not created by the structure, but by social actors, and 
then carried out by the structure as a means to an end. 
 
When asked about to what degree the managers take into account unwritten 
rules for actions in day-to-day operations, there was no significant difference 
between managers in public administrations and private enterprises. When 
looking at Spearman's rank correlations, there is a correlation between following 
informal rules and balancing public interests (0.23), but not for bureaucratic 
ethos. While this far from proves that informal systems carry values, this 
connection is worth exploring further to better understand the creation and 
sustainment of bureaucratic values. 
 
Alfred Chandler (1962) suggested that organizations adapt their structure to 
their strategy, and reinforced this with a case-study where change in 
management led to change in strategy, which again led to structural changes. 
While his theory almost deterministically suggests that change in strategy will 
lead to a change in structure, it illustrates how values could potentially influence 
structure. By understanding the relationship between structure and values as 
operating in the same manner as that of strategy and structure, I propose that 
values are not necessarily a result of formal structure; structure might be a 
byproduct of values. I do not propose that bureaucratic values fully determine the 
structure of the organization, or that bureaucratic values necessarily are part of 
a strategy, but the flexibility of the structure suggests that bureaucratic values 
do not depend fully on bureaucratic structure. A possible image of the 
relationship between structure and values is that "structure follows strategy as 
the left foot follows the right" (Mintzberg, 1990: 183). Bureaucratic structure and 
values coexists, but they do not necessarily determine each other.  
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10 Implications for Our Understanding 
of Public Administration  
So far I have reviewed and presented what these findings mean for our 
understanding of managers in public administrations and private enterprises. 
This part will briefly discuss the implications of my findings for our 
understanding of how public administrations operate as a sector. 
10.1 Beyond machine-bureaucracy 
It appears that the rational description of organizations does not fully explain the 
competing internal processes reported by managers of public administrations. 
Based on the responses from the managers, it would be more accurate to say that 
public administrations, like private enterprises, function as a hybrid of different 
systems. This section will suggest that based on my findings public 
administrations should not be seen as wholly rational "machine bureaucracies" 
(Mintzberg, 1980) any more than their private counterparts. 
 
Richard Scott suggests that it is not enough to understand organizations as 
singularly rational, and that we need to understand that "the rational and 
natural system perspectives are at variance because each focuses on a different 
end of a single continuum representing the range of organizational forms" (Scott, 
1981: 125). By seeing public administrations only as rational organizations, we 
fail to understand and appreciate a far more complex organizational form, one 
which is able to adapt and listen to its constituency, and yet serve the political 
level in a flexible and loyal way. By seeing them as purely rational, we fail to see 
the beauty in which they adapt to complex and changing demands, while serving 
the people they are established to help. 
 
Bureaucratic organizations come in many configurations. Henry Mintzberg 
(1980) presents five different organizational forms, where three of them are seen 
as bureaucratic: machine-bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy and 
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divisionalized forms, in addition to the more loosely shaped adhocracy and a 
simple organizational form. Machine-bureaucracies are the "classical 
bureaucracy", with a centralization of power and standardization of work. They 
operate in stable, simple environments with a clear hierarchy. Professional 
bureaucracies coordinate by standardization of skills that allows 
decentralization, and are found in complex environments. Divisionalized forms 
are coordinated by standardization of output and are in charge of operating 
specific areas with autonomy. These organizational forms can be combined into 
hybrid forms (Mintzberg, 1980).  
 
The attitudes of the managers show that the categorization of "public 
administration" is not sufficient to give a clear picture of the type of 
organizational form we can observe; the reality is more complex than 
organizational charts. Public managers appear to be less positive to structural 
elements and value involving their employees in decision-making, they orientate 
towards the market as adhocracies, but at the same time they experience vertical 
control like machine-bureaucracies, all while operating in complex environments.  
 
"Diagnosing" public sector with one organizational form based on managers' 
attitudes seems impossible, but based on the responses of the managers it is 
evident that public administration is complex in its diversity, and that the 
managers appear to behave as such. Based on managers’ responses there appears 
to be not one, but many contingencies influencing public sector – they appear to 
be under pressure from a wide variety of competing values. This discussion will 
not concern itself with the impossible task of fitting managers into one 
organizational form based on managers' attitudes, but it is important to 
acknowledge and emphasize that there is not one bureaucratic organizational 
form fitting all public administration. This notion is supported by the fact that 
managers report values and prioritizations fitting a wide variety of Mintzberg's 
forms (1980), and competing set of values (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981). 
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A consequence of this is that criticizing public administration for being 
"bureaucratic" is next to meaningless as there is no one bureaucratic form to 
criticize, but a wide selection. A substantial amount of criticism towards 
"bureaucracies" is based on the notion that they are inefficient and rigid, traits 
one would equate with the structural understanding of bureaucracies. By 
showing that these elements are not more prevalent among managers in public 
administration, it is demonstrated that seeing their managers as more 
bureaucratic than those in private enterprises in a structural sense is erroneous. 
Public Administrations must be understood as a hybrid-form of bureaucracy, 
more similar than different to private enterprises in structure.  
 
The perceived inefficiencies of the public administration should not be blamed on 
a process of "bureaucratization" of the public sector, but possibly on the values 
they are set to defend; the importance of a thorough, just and politically anchored 
decision-making (Clegg et al, 2011). These values are critical for the performance 
of public administration; without them they are not servicing the public as they 
are designated to do (Clegg et al, 2011). These values are central, but 
understanding public administrations as solely bureaucratic based on their 
bureaucratic values is a mistake (Olsen, 2006), they operate on multiple levels 
and in much more complex environments than that, and this is reflected in their 
managers.  
 
The core of the open system approach to organizations is that they are not only 
rational, formalized and goal-specific organizations; they are to a larger degree 
open to informal systems and goals and adapting to the environment (Scott, 
1981), and are seen as social groups adapting to their surroundings. The equal 
importance of owners and higher importance of media in their day-to-day work 
shown by managers in public organizations indicate that orientating towards the 
field, justifying their existence, is equally important for managers in public 
organizations as for private enterprises. This suggests that managers in public 
administrations are concerned with flexibility and readiness. While it is unclear 
if they are concerned with growth and acquisitions, it can be suggested that in an 
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effort to secure funding they feel the need for being flexible and communicating 
with their stakeholders.  
 
By understanding public administrations as open systems filled with the values 
of rationality, facilitated by a bureaucratic ethos and supported by structure and 
formalization, we can better understand how they can adapt structurally but 
keep their bureaucratic values. Just as the cogs in the bureaucracy keep going 
with new people in the same roles, the bureaucratic values stay intact as the 
organizational structure changes. As bureaucratic organizations adapt, they are 
called "post-bureaucratic" by some, but are they not just adapting to their 
environment? If we understand bureaucracies as open systems we understand 
that post-bureaucracy is nothing but adapting bureaucracies.  
 
Seeing public administrations as more than purely rational, we can fully 
appreciate the complex environment they are navigating. Complexity of goals 
and outputs is a constant challenge for managers in public administration, and it 
only stands to reason that this complexity in goals would manifest itself in the 
managers facing a set of competing values in their day-to-day operation. They are 
part managers of rational systems, internal process, human relations and open 
systems, all while trying to balance the needs of their organizations with public 
needs, and following orders from the political level they experience as creating 
inefficiencies. Additional research into managers in public administrations 
should further expand on this by looking at how managers are torn between 
competing values, and how it affects their ability to simultaneously be managers 
of employees and carrying out political decisions. 
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11 Conclusion 
This thesis has addressed whether managers in public administration are more 
bureaucratic in their attitudes toward structure and values than managers in 
private enterprises. By using empirical data from AFF's leadership study 2011, I 
am able to say that managers in public administrations are not more 
bureaucratic in their attitudes to structure, but show stronger bureaucratic 
values, than managers in private enterprises.  
 
I have argued that "bureaucratic" can be understood as both a question of 
structure and values. I present that managers in public administration show 
equal, or more negative, attitudes toward structural elements of organizing their 
work compared to managers in private enterprises. These differences are 
discussed and explained by factors such as complex goals, multidivisional 
hierarchies, expectations, demand for delivery and fear of consequences, as well 
as a higher degree of professionalism in public administration.  
 
Two major implications of this are that managers of public administration do not 
appear to be more "bureaucratized" than managers of private enterprises, and 
that public administrations should not be considered structurally more 
bureaucratic than private enterprises. If we presuppose that members are 
trained and socialized in their organization, we would expect that bureaucratic 
organizations would have produce manages with stronger bureaucratic attitudes.  
 
Further, I discuss the value-perspective of bureaucracy and how bureaucratic 
traits can be found in values portrayed by organizations. Defining bureaucratic 
ethos and public values as bureaucratic values, I find that managers in public 
administrations show more attitudes of bureaucratic values than managers of 
private enterprises. This suggests that while managers of public administrations 
are not structurally more bureaucratic, they appear to be more bureaucratic in 
terms of the values they portray. Managers of public administrations also show 
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more "post-bureaucratic"-values, suggesting they are as adaptable and "modern" 
as leaders in private enterprises. 
 
The implications of this are that while managers are more bureaucratic in their 
values, they are not less adaptable. One should not confuse performing a public 
service through the bureaucratic ethos with rigidity. The bureaucratic values are 
an asset for managers in public administrations; they make them able to perform 
their role free from inappropriate influences.  
 
It is suggested that the bureaucratic structure does not necessarily play a critical 
part in facilitating these values. A possible explanation of this is that the 
organizational culture in public administrations carries these values, or that 
informal hierarchies carrying these values exist to a higher degree in public 
administrations than in private enterprises. 
 
A further implication of the structural flexibility is that public administrations 
should not be seen as just rational organizations. This is illustrated by their 
interactions with their stakeholders and involvement of employees in 
organizational matters. According to the managers, it appears that public 
administrations are just as, or more willing, to let employees be involved in 
organizational activities, to orientate toward their stakeholders in day-to-day 
business, and follow informal rules as managers of private enterprises. This 
suggests that understanding public administrations as singularly rational 
organizations is a mistake. Managers in public administrations report equal or 
more traits correlating to managers of more complex organizational models in 
their willingness to orientate toward their stakeholders, involve employees, and 
follow informal rules than their private enterprise counterparts. 
 
A possible source of error in my conclusion is that the attitudes of the managers 
might not be a perfect representation of the objective reality of the organization's 
situation. To avoid this, I have as far as possible connected my findings with 
other research and empirical data, to show that these attitudes are part of a 
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trend and not a unique observation in this thesis. Another possible source of 
error is the selection of managers from organizations of more than 100 
employees. While the results are representative for large private enterprises and 
public administrations, it is possible they are not representative for all 
organizations. 
 
Further research in this field of study should include independent observations 
on these issues. A case-study in decision-making could identify if, and where, the 
perceived inefficiency of public administration manifests itself. This thesis has 
concerned itself more with the prevalence of the bureaucratic attitudes and 
values among managers, than their connection to efficiency. By furthering our 
knowledge of the concept "inefficiency", we will better understand whether the 
bureaucratic organizational form is creating it with its rigidity, if it is fixable, or 
if it is the cost of doing business with bureaucratic values. Formalization has for 
example been viewed as both a coercive and enabling force for organizations 
(Adler and Borys, 1996); this relationship should be further investigated. Another 
aspect worth looking into is the carriers of bureaucratic values. This thesis 
suggests that structural elements might not be as crucial for the existence of 
bureaucratic values as believed. The informal side of organizations may play an 
important part of carrying values. Further research into the relationship between 
structure and values should look past managers' attitudes to provide a deeper 
understanding of how these values are carried in public administrations. 
 
By understanding that public administrations are more similar to private 
enterprises than we might instinctively think, we can judge them more 
accurately and have an informed debate about their role and outputs, based on 
research and not preconceived notions about their performance. In order to 
improve something, we need to understand it. I hope to have contributed to the 
debate by showing that managers in public administrations might be more 
bureaucratic, but not in the structural sense of rigidity as many would like to 
believe. Managers in public administrations are more bureaucratic in their 
attitudes to values, and this should not be considered a bad thing.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: 
Uncertainty Avoidance: #12 Item 1-5. 
Centralization/Autonomy: #22: Item 1-5. 
Formalization: #22: Item 6-10. 
Structuralizing: #67: Item 1-6. 
 
12 
 
Nedenfor følger endel påstander om dine verdier i jobbsammenheng. Vi ber om at du tar stilling til hver av 
påstandene ved å angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig. 
ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE 1=Helt 2 3 4 5=Helt Kan ikke 
uenig     enig  svare 
 
• Det er viktig at jobbkrav og jobbforventninger er 
detaljerte og klare slik at ansatte alltid vet hva 1 2 3 4 5 6 
de skal gjøre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Regler er viktige fordi de viser ansatte hva 
virksomheten forventer av dem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Rutiner er nyttige fordi de letter arbeidet til de 
ansatte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Detaljerte instruksjoner er viktige for de ansatte 
• Jeg forventer at ansatte følger instruksjoner og 
prosedyrer nøyaktig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Velferden til arbeidsgruppen er viktigere enn 
individuell belønning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Arbeidsgruppens suksess er viktigere enn 
individuell suksess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Det er viktig å bli akseptert som medlem av 
arbeidsgruppen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
➠ 
 
  
83 
 
22 
 
Nedenfor følger noen påstander om beslutninger, regler og rutiner i virksomheten. Vennligst ta stilling til 
hver av påstandene ved å angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig. 
ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE 1=Helt 2 3 4 5=Helt
 Kan ikke uenig   
  enig  svare 
 
• Lite skjer i denne virksomheten uten at en leder 1 2 3 4 5 6 
har godkjent det . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Personer oppmuntres ikke til å ta egne 
beslutninger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
 
• Selv små saker må henvises til ledere 
høyere opp i virksomheten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Medarbeidere må spørre sjefen før de 
gjør noe som helst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Enhver beslutning medarbeidere tar må 
ha sjefens godkjenning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
• Virksomheten har et stort antall skrevne 
regler og retningslinjer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• En ¨regel og prosedyre¨ manual finnes 
og er lett tilgjengelig i virksomheten . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Der finnes en komplett 
stillingsbeskrivelse for de fleste jobber i 
virksomheten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Virksomheten har en skriftlig 
oversikt over nesten alle 
medarbeideres prestasjoner i 
jobben . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Det finnes et formelt 
introduksjonsprogram for nye 
medarbeidere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
 
67 
 
Så noen påstander om ditt forhold til arbeidsgruppen du leder. Angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 
1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig.
De som du har din egen ledergruppe, ønsker vi at du skal svare relatert til denne gruppen. 
 
 
ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE 1=Helt 2 3 4 5=Helt
 Kan ikke uenig   
  enig  svare 
 
• Jeg oppmuntrer til bruk av standardiserte 1 2 3 4 5 6 
prosedyrer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Jeg bestemmer hva som skal gjøres, og 
hvordan det blir gjort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Jeg tildeler gruppens medlemmer 
bestemte oppgaver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Jeg planlegger når arbeidet skal være ferdig . . . 
 
• Jeg opprettholder definerte standarder 
for ytelse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Jeg forventer at gruppens medlemmer 
følger gjeldende regler og reguleringer . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Appendix B: 
Autonomy: #51: Item 1-3. 
51 
 
Nedenfor følger en del påstander om kjennetegn som kan tenkes å beskrive din lederjobb. Med 
utgangspunkt i DIN lederjobb/ arbeidssituasjon ønsker vi at du skal ta stilling til hver av påstandene. 
Vennligst angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig. 
ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE 1=Helt 2 3 4 5=Helt Kan ikke 
uenig     enig  svare 
 
• I min jobb kan en selv velge oppgavene som 1 2 3 4 5 6 
skal gjøres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• I min jobb kan måten jeg utfører oppgavene på 
velges uavhengig av andre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• I min jobb har en selv stor frihet til å tenke og 
handle uavhengig av andre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Min jobb inneholder mange varierte 
arbeidsoppgaver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Min jobb preges lite av gjentakelser i 
arbeidsoppgavene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Appendix C: 
Power Distance: #12: Item 12-17. 
12 
 
Nedenfor følger endel påstander om dine verdier i jobbsammenheng. Vi ber om at du tar stilling til hver av 
påstandene ved å angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig. 
ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE 1=Helt 2 3 4 5=Helt Kan ikke 
uenig     enig  svare 
 
• Det er viktig at jobbkrav og jobbforventninger er 
detaljerte og klare slik at ansatte alltid vet hva 1 2 3 4 5 6 
de skal gjøre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Regler er viktige fordi de viser ansatte hva 
virksomheten forventer av dem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Rutiner er nyttige fordi de letter arbeidet til de 
ansatte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Detaljerte instruksjoner er viktige for de ansatte 
• Jeg forventer at ansatte følger instruksjoner og 
prosedyrer nøyaktig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Velferden til arbeidsgruppen er viktigere enn 
individuell belønning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Arbeidsgruppens suksess er viktigere enn 
individuell suksess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Det er viktig å bli akseptert som medlem av 
arbeidsgruppen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE 1=Helt 2 3 4 5=Helt Kan ikke 
uenig enig svare 
 
• Ansatte burde bare forfølge individuelle mål 
etter at gruppens velferd er tatt hensyn til . . . . . . 
 
• Ledere bør oppmuntre til lojalitet til gruppen 
selv om oppnåelse av individuelle mål blir 
vanskeligere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Individuelle medarbeidere forventes å gi opp 
egne mål for å fremme gruppens suksess . . . . . . 
 
• Ledere bør ta de fleste avgjørelser uten å 
rådføre seg med underordnede . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• Ledere må ofte bruke autoritet og makt overfor 
underordnede . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Ledere bør sjelden be om underordnedes 
synspunkter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Ledere bør unngå å ha kontakt med 
underordnede utenfor jobben . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Ansatte bør ikke være uenige i ledelsens 
beslutninger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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• Ledere bør ikke delegere viktige oppgaver til 
ansatte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Møter blir som oftest effektive når en mann 
leder dem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Det er viktigere for menn enn for kvinner å ha en 
yrkeskarriere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• For å løse organisatoriske problemer kreves det 
vanligvis en handlekraftig tilnærming som er 
typisk for menn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• Menn løser som regel problemer gjennom logisk 
analyse, mens kvinner ofte bruker intuisjon . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Menn er å foretrekke fremfor kvinner i 
ledelsesposisjoner på høyt nivå . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Appendix D: 
Subordinate Innovation: #45: Item 1-5. 
Subordinate: Co-operative conflict style: #64: Item 1-2. 
Manager: Compromising conflict style: #63: Item 7-8. 
Subordinate: Compromising conflict style : #64: Item 7-8. 
45 
 
Nedenfor følger endel påstander om dine underordnede. Vi ber om at du tar stilling til hver av påstandene 
ved å angi ditt svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig. 
ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE 1=Helt 2 3 4 5=Helt Kan ikke 
uenig     enig  svare 
 
Mine underordnede... 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
• fremmer ideer overfor andre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• viser kreativitet på jobben når anledningen byr 
seg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• utvikler gode planer for gjennomføring av nye 
ideer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• har ofte nye og innovative ideer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• foreslår nye måter jobbene kan utføres på . . . . . . 
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De samme strategiene for konflikthåndtering kan også følges av andre i virksomheten. Hvor ofte oppfatter du 
at dine underordnede følger følgende strategier? 
ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE 1=Aldri 2 3 4 5=Hele Kan ikke 
tiden  svare 
 
• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, 
foreslår de at dere jobber sammen for å finne 1 2 3 4 5 6 
løsninger? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, 
forsøker de å ta hensyn til begge parters 
anliggende for å finne en felles løsning? . . . . . . . 
 
• I situasjoner hvor dine underordnede er uenig 
med deg, insisterer de på at deres standpunkt 
aksepteres? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• I situasjoner hvor dine underordnede er uenig 
med deg, holder de fast ved sine egne 
synspunkter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Unngår dine underordnede diskusjoner med 
deg når konfrontrasjoner er sannsynlig? . . . . . . . 
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• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, 
holder de sine synspunkter for seg selv? . . . . . . . 
 
• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, foreslår de kompromisser for å nå en løsning på middelveien? . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, inngår de et kompromiss for å nå en akseptabel løsning? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, tilpasser de seg dine ønsker? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, gir de etter for dine forslag? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Nedenfor har vi listet opp en rekke strategier man kan følge for å håndtere konfliktsituasjoner. Hvor ofte 
følger du som leder følgende strategier? 
ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE 1=Aldri 2 3 4 5=Hele Kan ikke 
tiden  svare 
 
• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, 
foreslår du at dere jobber sammen for å finne 1 2 3 4 5 6 
løsninger? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, 
forsøker du å ta hensyn til begge parters 
anliggende for å finne en felles løsning? . . . . . . . 
 
• I situasjoner hvor du er uenig med dine 
underordnede, insisterer du på at ditt 
standpunkt aksepteres? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• I situasjoner hvor du er uenig med dine 
underordnede, holder du fast ved dine egne 
synspunkter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Unngår du diskusjoner med dine underordende 
når konfrontrasjoner er sannsynlig? . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, holder 
du dine synspunkter for deg selv? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, 
foreslår du kompromisser for å nå en løsning på 
middelveien? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Når du er uenig med underordnede, inngår du et 
kompromiss for å nå en akseptabel løsning? . . . 
 
• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, 
tilpasser du deg deres ønsker? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, gir du 
etter for deres forslag? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
